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           Since Xi Jinping’s tenure as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
began in 2012, nationalism is a topic often discussed by scholars analyzing China’s behavior. 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, China's prodigious economic growth, 
antagonistic political environment, and restrictive social policies have only added to its mystique. 
How can a nation encumbered with the societal difficulties of a Third World nation, restricted by 
a quasi-authoritarian Communist government, and largely feared by the international community 
unite to achieve monumental growth in economic development and political influence? The 
ultimate architect of China's perpetual rise in the twenty-first century is the nationalist narrative 
perpetuated by the CCP under Xi Jinping's leadership. Xi Jinping's careful consolidation of 
political power coincides with the fortification of a modern, state-centered constructivist 
nationalist agenda.  
         This thesis attempts to advance our understanding of Chinese nationalism in the Xi Jinping-
era. China’s remarkable economic prosperity and its growing political influence within the 
international community will likely persist through the near future.  Therefore, it is essential that 
scholars understand the cultural, historical, and political factors that influence the development 
of the distinct Chinese nationalism that drives development. If scholars can view China’s actions 
through the lens of Chinese—not Western—conceptions of nationalism, then the international 
community will be better equipped to approach China's current policies with a culturally 
sensitive, pragmatic understanding vice perennial apprehension.     
 The second contribution of this thesis is an analysis of topics often discussed regarding 
contemporary China. China’s present policies toward Muslim minorities, domestic corruption, 
iii 
 
and environmentalism are titular initiatives of Xi Jinping’s administration and are widely 
criticized by the international community. Evaluating these issues through the outlook of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism will facilitate a greater understanding of these topics and their 
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As the pre-eminent power in Asia and a rising power within the global community, the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) dominates global conversations on the Third World's rise 
within the international hierarchy. Since opening its doors to the West in 1978, China has 
pursued rapid modernization to support its prodigious economic growth and long-term 
hegemonic goals. As a result of these efforts, China transformed into a geopolitical power whose 
flourishing economy, shrinking civil society, rigid political structure, and, at times, polarizing 
international diplomacy ensures that the nation's quest for global preeminence will remain 
controversial. The prospect of a world order dictated by Chinese hegemony and widespread 
misconceptions on China's political goals feed the Western world's already robust anxieties of a 
China-centric future. Western governments must first understand China's political motivations, 
cultural specificities, and the underlying ethos of its quest for global supremacy. China's current 
political maneuverings are driven by a distinct Chinese nationalism, as articulated by the CCP 
under Xi Jinping. This nationalism determines the direction of China's political, economic, and 
social interactions domestically and internationally. To adequately assess China's current and 
future operations, especially as the rising global hegemon, a comprehensive understanding of the 
CCPs singular brand of nationalism is imperative. 
Despite the modern origins of China’s current interpretation of nationalism, nationalism 
studies are varied and abundant throughout academic literature. Contemporary analysis of 
2 
 
nationalism originates in the study of the specificities of nation-states and their citizens. Notably, 
Benedict Anderson’s theory of an imagined community provides the cornerstone of 
contemporary theorizing of nationalism. Anderson claims that the modern nation-state emerged 
from an imagined political community that is both limited and sovereign.1 This imagined 
community creates a national identity characterized by physical borders, political policies, and 
societal interactions. While an imagined community effects the development of national identity, 
interactions between the government and the population determine power dynamics. Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen summarizes that when social groups develop along similar cultures, a small 
group will invariably become the privileged class.2 In addition to dictating societal interactions, 
the empowerment of the privileged class facilitates the transition of personal loyalties from 
cultural groups to the larger nation-state. Eriksen asserts that the predominance of the privileged 
class is fundamental to the development of the political and social hierarchy, which ultimately 
influences nation-states’ operations. Ultimately, a precise understanding of nationalism requires 
a thorough awareness of nations and nation-states' physical and ideological origins.   
Throughout nationalism studies, three broad schools of thought are predominate: 
primordialism, modernism, and state-centric constructivism. Promordialists like Anthony D. 
Smith maintain that ethnic affiliation or identity is the central influence in the development of 
nationalism.3 Without a common ethnic identity, citizens cannot unite behind a singular nation-
state or national identity. Modernists, notably Ernest Gellner, assert that nationalism is a 
 
1 Benedict Anderson, "Imagined Communities," In Nations and Nationalism: A Reader, edited by Spencer Philip 
and Wollman Howard. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, 49. 
2 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "Nationalism," In Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London; 
New York, NY: Pluto Press, 2010, 126, accessed May 6, 2020, doi:10.2307/j.ctt183h0h1.12. 
3 Anthony D. Smith. "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism." International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72, no. 3 (1996): 446. 
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construct of the characteristics of modern life.4 Industrialization, technological developments, 
mass migrations, and even global conflicts affect the development of nationalist identity. 
Although Smith and Gellner both attribute ethnic identity as a contributing factor to the 
development of nationalist ideology, Gellner credits the specificities and traumas of modern life 
and its effects on society as more influential. While Smith and Gellner view nationalism as the 
byproduct of natural societal evolution, Eugen Weber espouses that nationalism is a specific 
product of the nation-state’s designs. Weber’s state-centric constructivist view maintains that 
nationalism is a fabrication of the nation-state and its political ambitions.5 Rejecting the notion 
that nationalism originates from ethnicity or modernity, Weber instead emphasizes the nation-
state’s influence in shaping nationalist sentiment. While each is distinct, primordialism, 
modernism, and state-centric constructivism each provide useful interpretations of nationalism 
that policymakers still utilize today. 
After analyzing these various theories of nationalism, policymakers can see direct 
evidence of their influence on China’s nationalist narrative today. Since Xi Jinping's tenure 
began in 2012, China ardently espouses a modern and state-centric constructivist nationalist 
narrative. This narrative's primacy is possible due to the calculated empowerment of the CCP 
under Xi Jinping’s leadership. To fully grasp the profound influence of nationalism on Chinese 
society, an acknowledgement of the profound influence of the CCP—the direct agent of this 
nationalist ethos and China’s larger hegemonic aims—is imperative While invariably influenced 
by domestic factors and the diversifying global world order, China's rapid economic 
development and its current political priorities are the designs of the CCP's power apparatus. 
 
4 Ernest Gellner, “Nationalisms and the New World Order,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
47(5): 29. 
5 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchman, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 486. 
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Despite Deng Xiaoping's attempts to limit the formerly inseparable nature of Party-State 
operations, the current CCP reverts to nearly total control of political, social, and economic life. 
Party-State operations are once again indivisible. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the CCP 
habitually affirms its overarching authority on Chinese society and Xi Jinping's primacy. Mao 
Zedong's famous quote, "Party, government, military, civilian, and academic; east, west, south, 
north, and center, the party leads everything" is often referenced by the state-run media or in the 
speeches of Xi Jinping.6 In October 2017, the National Congress amended the CCPs institution 
codifying the Party’s authority and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era. 7 The communique also directed the CCP to “uphold and 
strengthen the overall leadership of the Party” and stipulated that unequivocal support for the 
Party and Xi Jinping is essential to "great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a 
new era."8 The communique directed the “entire Party to uphold and strengthen the overall 
leadership of the Party” and ensure that China continues “working to secure a decisive victory in 
finishing building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.”9 The CCP continues to 
reaffirm that unequivocal support for and empowerment of the Party is essential to achieving the  
By perpetuating the narrative that China's global success is contingent upon the unrivaled 
authority of the Party, the CCP asserts its relevance in society and its dominance in dictating 
national policies. 
 
6 Simon Denyer, “China sets up new foreign aid agency to better project influence abroad,” The Washington Post, 
March 13, 2018, accessed March 20, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-promotes-foreign-aid-
bolsters-environment-ministry-in-government-shake-up/2018/03/13/d3c26d94-267a-11e8-ab19-
06a445a08c94_story.html. 
7 Xinhua News Agency, “Full text of resolution on amendment to CPC Constitution,” October 24, 2017, accessed on 





The political motivation underlying the ethos that an unrivaled CCP is required for 
China's rise is multifaceted.  On a surface level, a strong Party begets a formidable government 
capable of asserting itself within the global hierarchy. If China hopes to achieve a global 
leadership position, then the CCP must be efficient, well-organized, and capable of supporting 
the tasks at hand. Additionally, since the nation's founding in 1949, the CCP remains a focal 
point for China's political identity. A relic of cultural history and a symbol of China's 
revolutionary past, the CCP political apparatus will invariably maintain its enduring relevance in 
China. On a more nuanced level, efforts to empower the CCP as the cornerstone of Chinese 
politics and society reveal an overwhelming governmental fixation with curating and 
perpetuating a distinct Chinese nationalist identity. This nationalist identity must inspire the 
Chinese people to support China's rise and deter international doubters of China's global 
ambitions. Ultimately, a nationalist ideology is the CCPs formidable tool for consolidating public 
approval, deterring dissension, and espousing a sympathetic global image. The modern iteration 
of the CCP transformed from a formidable political organization and symbol of the revolution 
into the executor of China's dream of a hegemonic future.  
With its unprecedented authority over Chinese political and social life, the CCP 
perpetuated a modern state-centric constructivist nationalist narrative. This nationalist narrative 
relies on one primary concept: China must overcome its historic traumas and the negative 
influences of modernity to fulfill the CCPs imagination of Chinese rejuvenation, known as the 
China Dream. To achieve China's glorious future, China must redress the ills of the century of 
humiliation--a common reference in Xi Jinping’s speeches—and assert its rightful position 
within the international hierarchy. To the CCP, modernity—Western colonizers, global conflicts, 
capitalist economic influences—created the contemporary nation downtrodden by circumstance 
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but dedicated to revival. China’s self-image as a wronged but virtuous civilization, the natural 
center of a hierarchical arrangement of Asian states, is already causing it to act in ways that are 
oppressive to its people, worrying to its neighbors and destabilizing to regional peace and 
security.10 The CCPs emphasis on historic traumas facilitates oppressive policies in support of 
manufactured modern nationalism. Effectively, the CCPs evolution to state-centric constructivist 
nationalism would not be possible without its modern nationalist foundation; both ideas unite to 
form modern Chinese nationalism. This nationalism surpasses unity through ethnic identity, 
cultural affiliation, or historical traumas alone. Instead, the CCPs brand of nationalism prioritizes 
the importance of, the authority of, and obedience to the Chinese state. Like Eugen Weber 
described French nationalism, the CCP similarly “instilled a national view of things in regional 
minds and confirmed the power of that view by offering advancement to those who adopted it.” 
Loyalty to the Party, State, and Xi Jinping's vision of Chinese rejuvenation—socialism with 
Chinese characteristics—is the ultimate unifier for the Chinese people. Expertly blending 
historical traumas, modern adversities, and future aspirations, the CCPs manufactured 
nationalism supports the Party's global aspirations. 
To perpetuate this nationalist ethos, the CCP emphasizes three concepts: the importance 
of national unity, the authority of the central government, and the creation of a positive global 
image. National unity will provide the CCP with the domestic stability required to execute the 
hard tasks of the China Dream. The CCPs fixation with establishing domestic stability and 
national unity is most evident in their treatment of Muslim minorities in the Western province of 
Xinjiang. Similarly, India's treatment of Muslim minorities in Kashmir emphasizes these 
troubling trends. While the international community largely views China’s treatment of Muslim 
 
10  Bill Hayton. The Invention of China. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 244. 
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minority groups in Xinjiang as oppressive, China’s refusal to reform indicates that they view 
national unity as paramount. Like their approach to establishing national unity, the CCP employs 
similar coercive tactics to empower the authority of the CCP via corruption reforms. Xi Jinping’s 
much-lauded war on corruption essentially demonstrates the CCPs use of alternative means to 
quell internal dissent, eradicate political rivals, and empower a Party-State structure where a Xi 
Jinping compliant CCP is supreme. Finally, the CCPs treatment of environmental civil society 
organizations indicates its desire to perpetuate a global image as a leader on environmental 
issues. The Party's public declarations of environmentalism contradict its consistent tightening of 
Chinese civil society. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP prioritizes internal unity, the central 
government's authority, and creating a positive global image as small chapters of their larger 
political narrative.  
A deeper analysis of China’s present tactics to enforce national unity, empower the 
central government's authority, and perpetuate a positive global image as a leader on 
environmental affairs is imperative for multiple reasons. First, these three examples are 
paramount to understanding China’s nationalist ideology. While seemingly independent topics, 
China’s policies regarding Muslim minority rights, domestic corruption, and environmental civil 
society directly support different facets of their larger nationalist ethos. A thorough investigation 
into each case provides essential history and commentary on politics, culture, and society in 
China, crucial to understanding the nation's many contradictions. Second, a greater insight into 
China's nationalist ideology can unearth its grander ambitions. The CCPs nationalist narrative 
supports nation building both within China and beyond its borders. While China’s designs to 
establish itself as the global hegemon are readily apparent, their tactics to achieving this goal are 
still developing. If the international community understands how China views or reacts to 
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domestic issues, perhaps it will indicate their approaches to future crisis, developing conflicts, 
and other global concerns. China’s coercive tactics to support Chinese rejuvenation could allude 
to similar coercive tactics within the global community. Third, an in-depth analysis of Chinese 
nationalism will provide further conversation for this field of study. As a Communist quasi-
authoritarian state characterized by a nearly capitalist-like quest for economic superiority, China 
is a nation full of paradoxes that provides plentiful material for analysis. The standard concepts 
of nationalism fail to address the singular experience in China today. To be adequately analyzed, 
Chinese nationalism must be assessed through a distinctly Chinese lens. Ultimately, a greater 
understanding of China’s nationalist ethos will better equip the international community to 
discern China’s current political ideology and perhaps predict their future intentions. The CCPs 
policies toward Muslim minority populations, domestic corruption, and environmental civil 
society indicate that national rejuvenation can only be achieved through a distinct, Xi Jinping 
designed, Chinese nationalism. In the coming years, nationalism with Chinese characteristics 

















Nationalism and Muslim Minority Rights 
As the pre-eminent powers in Asia, India and China dominate the region's socio-
economic and political dynamics. This regional primacy also supports both nations' broader 
aspirations elevating their status within the international hierarchy. Despite these similarities, 
India and China have vastly divergent cultural histories, societal norms, and governmental 
structures. By examining each nation’s Muslim minority rights policies, it is evident that both 
India and China prescribe to similar nationalist agendas. The administrations of India’s Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi and China’s General Secretary Xi Jinping provide classic examples of 
coercive nationalism in the pursuit of domestic stability and national unity. While extensive, the 
existing academic literature on nationalism and Muslim minority rights in India and China focus 
extensively on policy implementation without shedding ample light on these policies greater 
implications for both Asia and the global community.   
Theories of Nationalism 
Three primary schools of thought emerge throughout theoretical discussions of 
nationalism: primordialism, modernism, and state-centric constructivism. Primordialists, like 
Anthony Smith, argue that nations develop from historical ethnies, or ethnic communities. With 
their shared memories, myths, symbols, and values, ethnies will invariably form groups and, 
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eventually, nations that will create distinct nation-states.11 Unlike the primordialists assertion that 
ethnies are the foundation for the nation-state, modernists, like Ernest Gellner, maintain that 
nationalism is a creation of modernity that reflects the basic social organization of the industrial 
world and its people.12 The mass migrations, global conflicts, technological advancements, and 
social realignments of modernity are the most substantial influencers of the development of 
nationalist sentiment. Like modernists view nationalism through the scope of modern traumas 
and advancements, state-centric constructivists similarly view nationalism as a modern 
development. In From Peasants to Frenchmen, Eugen Weber argued that France’s Third 
Republic (1870-1914) was the originator of the French republic. Despite France's lengthy 
history, it was the homogenization of society and culture through the French government's 
effective policies which created the French nation-state. Thus, for state-centric constructivists, 
the nation develops not from ethnic identification or the trials of modernity but the careful 
calculation of an effective government. The theories of primordialism, modernism, and state-
centric constructivism provide a use framework to analyze contemporary nationalism. 
To specifically address the ethnicity’s influence on the development of nationalist 
sentiment, scholars largely identify two realms: civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. While 
civic nationalism maintains that national identity is purely political, ethnic nationalism maintains 
that national identity is purely cultural.13 Under the tenants of civic nationalism, individuals with 
similar views or principles voluntarily unite behind a common ideology, regardless of their 
ethnic, religious, or cultural heritage. Conversely, nineteenth century German political thinkers 
 
11 Smith, 446.  
12 Gellner, 29.  
13 Genevieve Zubrzycki, "The Classical Opposition Between Civic and Ethnic Models of Nationhood: Ideology, 




such as Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte argue that nationalism is determined 
only by ethnic similarities. For Herder and Fichte, a cultural nation can precede political unity, 
yet statehood must inevitably develop to perpetuate the singularity of an ethnic or cultural 
group.14  While still components of both civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism, social 
interactions and cultural cohesion is ultimately secondary to the ethnic ties that citizens who 
support an ethnic nationalist ethos. To address ethnicity’s effects on the development of 
nationalist thought, a thorough understanding of the nuances of civic and ethnic nationalism is 
imperative. 
This tension between interpretations of civic and ethnic nationalisms culminates with 
various scholars arguing for the classification of nationalist schools of thought as Western or 
Eastern. Hans Kohn, specifically, establishes a distinction between “French” and “German” 
understandings of the nationhood by categorizing “good” nationalism as civic, liberal, 
progressive, inclusive and unifying while corresponding to “civilized” western democracies.15 
Conversely, “bad” nationalism is ethnic, primitive, conservative, regressive, exclusive, divisive, 
and typical of Eastern nations.16 While these distinctions between “good” and “bad” nationalism 
can be pejorative—and must be assessed within Kohn’s socio-historic lens of an embattled 
World War II era consciousness at its publication in 1944—on a larger scale they highlight the 
broader reality of ethnicity’s involvement in nation building. According to Kohn, the state 
preceded the nation; civic nation building was therefore guided by and coincided with the 
interests of the state, while in the East, the emergence of nations preceded the building of the 
 
14 Zubrzycki, 284.  
15 Ibid, 275. 
16 Ibid, 275. 
12 
 
state.17 Additionally, Kohn argues that the ethnic nationalism of newly established nations can 
develop into the civic nationalism of modernized societies. Using Kohn’s approach to classify 
nationalism between Western and Eastern nations, the concerted fabrication of civic nationalism 
by like-minded citizenry grants the ethos a semblance, however misguided, of stability over 
ethnically centered nationalism. 
From scholarly discussions specific to modern Chinese nationalism, two primary schools 
of thought emerge regarding the origins of China’s contemporary policies: they are a response to 
the century of humiliation, or they are the manifestation of China’s historic conception of their 
essentiality to the global community. William Callahan, Jackqueline Newmyer Deal and Wu 
Guoguang argue that contemporary Chinese nationalism is founded upon the early twentieth 
century passionate and somehow despondent response to China’s decline as it encountered the 
West.18 The traumas of the inequalities of the colonial period and the fall of the Qing Dynasty 
created a nation desperate to overcome its perceived continual biases. While Callahan, Deal, and 
Guoguang found their arguments upon China’s twentieth century indignities, Ian Johnson and 
Bill Hayton maintain that traditional perceptions of Chinese exceptionalism forms the basis of 
modern nationalism. While Johnson and Hayton acknowledge the importance of the century of 
humiliation in the formation of modern Chinese policies, they place greater weight on the 
broader Chinese notion of national superiority. Specifically, a country that believes it has a 
superior civilization, that its population evolved separately from the rest of humanity and that it 
has a special place at the top of an imperial order will always be seen as a threat by its neighbors 
 
17 Yael Tamir, “Not So Civic: Is there a Difference between Ethnic and Civic Nationalism?” Annual Review of 
Political Science: 22: 424, accessed May 2, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-022018-024059. 
18 Guoguang Wu, "From Post-Imperial to Late Communist Nationalism: Historical Change in Chinese Nationalism 




and the world.19 Even if China’s century of humiliation had not occurred, their desire for global 
prominence would remain constant. Despite diverging opinions on the origins of modern 
Chinese nationalism, all scholars maintain that China’s current nationalist ambitions are 
singularly focused on perpetuating the power of the Chinese state.   
Historic Origins of India and China 
Their historic origins greatly influenced India and China’s respective identities. India’s 
political identity, many scholars argue, is intimately tied to adherence to the secularism 
associated with democratic ideals. India’s founders sought to not only afford themselves the 
freedoms lost under British colonial rule, but also to eradicate the fears of a majority hegemony 
by providing special status to the minorities, Amalendu Misra argues.20 Safeguards were 
provided to minority groups, specifically Muslims, to create an institutionalized space for 
cultural observances. This institutionalized space, Alam Anwar claims, is the cornerstone of 
Indian multiculturalism and federalism.21 Since its founding, successive Indian governments 
used strict adherence to federalist ideals as the foundation for minority rights legislation and 
practices. Ultimately, secularism as the basis for governance has been critical to the success of 
Indian democracy, Rollie Lal argues.22 The academic emphasis on identifying secularism in 
Indian minority rights policies fails to address the shortcomings of its oversimplification in 
execution. Although India provides generalized freedoms to minority groups, the effect of broad 
 
19 Hayton, 248.  
20  Amalendu Misra. "Hindu Nationalism and Muslim Minority Rights in India." International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights 7, no. 1 (2000): 3, accessed March 21, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/24675146. 
21 Anwar Alam, "Political Management of Islamic Fundamentalism: A View from India," Ethnicities 7, no. 1 (2007): 
46, accessed March 21, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/23889420. 
22 Rollie Lal. "Islam in India." In The Muslim World After 9/11, by Rabasa Angel M., Nernard Cheryl,  
Chalk Peter, Fair C. Christine, Karasik Theodore, Lal Rollie, Lesser Ian, and Thaler David. RAND Corporation, 
2004: 306, accessed March 21, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg246af.16. 
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policies on continued discrimination and political, economic, and social disparities within the 
Indian population is apparent.  
While an emphasis on secularism dictates India’s origin narrative, China’s national 
identity is heavily influenced by the communal structure of the Han majority, as Wang Jianping 
writes.23 This communal structure draws influence not only from the traditional Confucian 
emphasis on familial unity, but also the example of the Soviet Union. In Wang Jianping’s 
examination of China’s Islamic revival movement, the author notes that the Chinese government 
applied a two-pronged strategy of containment and absorption based on Josef Stalin’s tactics in 
the 1950s.24  If minority groups could be integrated into the idealism of a greater society--in 
Stalin’s case via aggression rather than political representation--then errant thought could be 
stifled. Raphael Israeli claims China drew more heavily on the absorption vice containment 
approach.25 Inspired by Lenin’s views that national minorities should have the right of secession 
and the proletariat should seek to unify to diminish desires for secessionism, Israeli proposes that 
China’s minority policies continue the assumption that communal identity supersedes individual 
or group rights.26 Like Stalin’s policies aggressively denied a heterogeneous Soviet Union, so too 
did the Cultural Revolution over-emphasize communal identity. Gerard Postiglione argues that 
during the Cultural Revolution nationality policy was no longer denied because the idea of China 
as a multinational country was destroyed.27 Just as the Soviet Union inspired contemporary 
 
23 Wang Jianping. "Unity in Diversity: The Islamic Revival Movement in China Today." In Religion in China: 
Major Concepts and Minority Positions, edited by Deeg Max and Scheid Bernhard, Wien: Austrian Academy of 
Sciences Press, 2015: 176, accessed March 25, 2020. doi:10.2307/j.ctt1vw0pdc.13. 
24 Jianping, 176. 
25 Raphael Israeli. "The Muslim Minority in the People's Republic of China." Asian Survey 21, no. 8 (1981): 911, 
accessed March 25, 2020, doi:10.2307/2643890. 
26 Israeli, 911. 
27 Gerard Postiglione. "National Minorities and Nationalities Policy in China." In The National Question: 
Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century, edited by Berberoglu Berch, Temple 
University Press, 1995: 275, accessed April 5, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt14bstd1.15. 
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Chinese communal identity, so too did its dissolution from 1989-1991 facilitate a policy change, 
according to June Teufel Dreyer.28 The Soviet Union’s loss of control over its client states as 
well as the Tiananmen Square protests fed pre-existing fears that discontented ethnic majorities 
could potentially destabilize societal progress. According to these scholars, the Soviet Union 
serves as both an example of proper communism and a cautionary tale of the communal identity 
suffering due to minority groups.  
Legal Protections of Minority Rights 
The ideologies of secularism and communal society influenced the implementation of 
these theories into law. Many scholarly works examine the special status granted to minority 
groups in legislation. For example, Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay discusses the powers granted to 
Muslims, especially Kashmiri Muslims, in the Indian constitution and the reaffirmation of this 
synthetic identity through robust political discourse.29 Manoj Kumar Sinha, however, both details 
the various powers provided to Kashmiri Muslims while also pointing out that the Constitution 
fails to create an executable nationalized policy on minorities. By deferring to individual states, 
the Indian federal government leaves the systems vulnerable to corruption, prejudice, and overall 
state inaction.30 In China, similarly, the broadness of federal policies contributes to inefficient 
execution at the state level. The Western Development Plan, initiated in 1999 to boost industrial 
development and overall economic improvement of western China, is touted as a significant 
contributor to curtailing Muslim minority rights. As a result of the expansive powers granted to 
provincial governments (largely run by Han Chinese appointees from Eastern provinces) and 
 
28 June Teufel Dreyer. "China's Vulnerability to Minority Separatism." Asian Affairs 32, no. 2 (2005): 69, accessed 
March 25, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/30172869. 
29 Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay. "Kashmir's Secessionist Movement Resurfaces: Ethnic Identity, Community 
Competition, and the State." Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 927, accessed March 21, 2020, 
doi:10.1525/as.2009.49.6.924. 
30 Manoj Kumar Sinha. "Minority Rights: A Case Study of India." International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights 12, no. 4 (2005): 366, accessed March 22, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/24675308. 
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unrealistic development goals, the economic and political freedoms of the Uighurs decreased, 
Barry Sautman and Elizabeth Van Wie Davis claim.31 The Muslim experience in Kashmir and 
Xinjiang is an example of the detrimental nature of unspecific and unmonitored minority rights 
policies.  
In addition to addressing the procedural inefficiencies of some minority rights policies, 
academic literature also examines the cultures of corruption these broken systems invariably 
support. Arun Kumar Nayak notes that India’s central failure is that it has democratic institutions 
but failed in democratic action.32 The ambiguity of India’s policies toward Kashmir created a 
vacuum where non-governmental organizations and unaffiliated actors could impart significant 
influence in local economies, politics, and society. Nalini Kant Jha asserts that in questioning the 
traditional authorities of the state, these empowered non-state actors could exploit both 
Kashmir’s underdeveloped economy and the vulnerability of the increasingly polarized local 
population.33 India’s mismanagement of ethno-national demands facilitated competition and 
corruption between central political elites and subnational ethnic elites in Kashmir, as Jugdep S. 
Chima argues.34 Similarly, China’s mismanagement of ethnic demands in Western provinces 
begets unforeseen circumstances. Jihyeon Jeong and Elizabeth Van Wie Davis detail the effects 
of the rampant corruption, widespread migration from Han majority areas, and unequal economic 
benefits of the Western Development Plan in their respective works.35 The minority groups the 
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Western Development Plan sought to uplift through an expansion of industry and infrastructure 
were the most adversely affected by the plan’s administration. Uighurs, specifically, lost 
lucrative industry contracts and influential government positions to Han Chinese migrants, 
exacerbating the pre-existing socio-economic divide and political polarization. Rather than 
correcting regional imbalances, the Western Development Plan took on strategies and projects 
that increasingly strengthened only select border regions and their peoples.36 While the 
rejuvenation policies of Kashmir and Xinjiang were economic successes for their respective 
nations, they ultimately widened the socio-economic divide between Muslim minorities and the 
majority populations. 
Nationalism in Political Parties  
 From these economically successful yet culturally taxing development programs, two 
distinctive nationalistic ideologies gained momentum. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
championed Hindutva in India, while the CCP emphasized the prestige of the Han majority in 
China. Scholars note that both political forces are central to both India and China’s reinvigorated 
national identities. In tying culture to race and creating the possibility of defining a “pure” 
nation, Hindutva expands the notion of minorities as foreign by simultaneously supporting a 
territorial idea of culture, Sangeeta Kamat notes.37 This notion of cultural and territorial alienness 
specifically endangers the Muslims of Kashmir, who are central targets of the BJP’s Hindutva 
rhetoric and oppressive policies. Muhammad Waqas Sajjad and Anand Teltumbde describe the 
pervasive thought that Kashmiri Muslims will one day both overtake the Indian Hindu 
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population and bring the downfall of the unifying common culture of Hinduism.38 While the BJP 
fears the loss of a distinctive Hindu Indian culture, the CCP similarly fears a loss of a Han 
Chinese identity. Much like the violence of Kashmiri separatists adversely affect regional 
industries and investments, so too do Uighur separatists threaten the economic stability of the 
region. According to Hasmath Reza, heightened religious consciousness among Muslim Uighurs, 
if not adequately managed, can both lead to dissent and support a discourse that rejects national 
unity.39 The national pride and unity the CCP promotes—heightened since Xi Jinping’s 
leadership in the party—is perceived to be in peril from the divergent forces. Xinjiang’s Uighurs 
are considered a threat to the unified identity deemed essential to China’s advancement.  
 The adverse effects of renewed Indian and Chinese nationalism culminate in the present 
treatment of Kashmiri and Uighur Muslims. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has virtually 
eradicated Muslim Indian citizenship through the BJP’s Citizenship Amendment Bill. Under Xi 
Jinping’s direction the CCP has placed thousands of Uighurs in indoctrination camps. While both 
cases claim their actions are justified based on separatist violence, the underlying ideology is a 
problematic interpretation of the essentiality of national unity. This paper seeks to examine what 
Li Xi Yuan describes as the dynamic relationship between ethnicity and nationalism and the 
similar factors that ignite them both.40 From the existing academic literature, parallels exist 
between India and China’s political origins, ideological goals, and legislative shortcomings. 
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However, a more in-depth analysis of the connection between these ideas and the present 
policies in each nation is necessary for a wholistic understanding of each state’s nationalistic 
goals. Nationalistic fervor characterized by the continual degradations of minority rights, 
regardless of a country’s type of government, could foreshadow future conflict in the regional or 
global community. The examples of India and China indicate that it is a country’s degree of 
nationalism, not its type of government, that has the greater impact on the development of 
minority rights policies. 
Domestic Corruption 
 Systemic corruption is a prevailing characteristic of Chinese society. In addition to its 
cultural significance throughout Chinese history, systemic corruption also affects contemporary 
China's political, economic, and social development. As China continues to modernize and assert 
its influence within the global hierarchy, continued analysis of the significant factors influencing 
Chinese growth is inevitable. Specifically, the origins and implications of systemic corruption is 
a topic increasingly under investigation in academic literature. Thus far, literature primarily 
focuses on analyzing corruption's cultural roots, the nature of recent anticorruption reforms, and 
Xi Jinping's underlying political agenda as articulated by CCP policies. While ambitious, Xi 
Jinping's well-publicized anticorruption initiatives are unproven in their effectiveness and 
indicate a larger political narrative.  
Inherent Difficulties of Corruption Studies 
 To complete a thorough analysis of China's corruption, acknowledging corruption studies' 
inherent difficulties is imperative. Specifically, meticulous reporting, metrics, and subsequent 
analysis are unavailable for a nation still under the firm control of a single-party system. The 
gradual social, economic, and political diversification of Chinese society is only permissible 
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within the CCP control scope. Thus, to many corruption scholars, China poses additional 
complications to the already difficult study of corruption. Yong Guo notes that developing 
nations especially experience the most significant difficulties in proper reporting due to the 
“hiddenness gap” and the “sensitivity gap.”41 Both gaps account for the delay in identifying and 
reporting corruption by developing nations, particularly those subject to centralized rule. 
Inaccurate reporting of corrupt offenses also affects the development of organizational structures 
to support adjudicating these issues. Scholars such as Andrew Wedeman and Yong Guo have 
discussed the diverging state and CCP corruption agencies, which convolute an already burdened 
system.42 While many developing nations like China succumb to corruption underreporting due 
to inadequate organizational or legal support, Andrew Wedeman also notes that China is 
particularly susceptible to the Transparency International (TI) rating system's ambiguity.  
Because it is based on numerous polls and applicable to countries with a wide range of rankings, 
the TI sample will never be comprehensive or representative.43 The TI sample naturally under-
represents countries in which corruption is prevalent, like China. Domestic organizational issues 
and the international corruption index rankings' inherent ambiguities beget complications in 
establishing China's accurate corruption assessments. 
Cultural Perceptions of Corruption 
 While corruption analysis is subject to the inherent difficulties of accurate reporting, 
corruption in China is also affected by historic cultural biases. Many scholars observe that to the 
Chinese, corruption is so widespread and commonplace that it is widely accepted. Kilkon Ko and 
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Cuifen Wang also note that in imperial China, the misappropriation of public funds was accepted 
because it was assumed that public officials had the right and public authority to do so.44 The 
precedence of accepting corruption in imperial China still exists in modern China, as Melanie 
Manion notes. Corruption is viewed as an income supplement45 or merely as an impropriety 
rather than an actual crime.46 Lucien Pye similarly notes overwhelming compliance with corrupt 
practices in the historic Confucius bureaucratic culture and the modern Party-State apparatus. 
Pye notes that widespread acceptance of corruption is also linked to the feigned compliance 
system of Chinese politics.47 By failing to publicly acknowledge political factions or 
bureaucratic misbehavior, Chinese politicians can continue participating in corrupt activities 
while simultaneously denying their existence. Blatant predatory actions by political officials, 
government agencies, or even ordinary business personnel foster a unilateral resignation to 
accept corruption. Ultimately, numerous scholars highlight the historic resigned acceptance of 
corruption as a significant source in its continued prevalence in contemporary China. 
While many scholars note the historical acceptance of corruption by the Chinese public 
as the main factor in its enduring influence, some scholars maintain that outrage, rather than 
resignation, at corruption is a superior characterization. Andrew Wedeman notes that high profile 
corruption scandals often capture the rabid attention of the Chinese public. For example, the 
Gang of Four trials in the 1970s and the suicide of Beijing Vice Mayor Wang Baosen in the late 
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1990s captivated the public.48  Roderic Broadhurst and Peng Wang describe a similar public 
frenzy regarding the prosecution of beloved politician Bo Xilai, who established a cult-like base 
of support among the masses.49 Interestingly, some scholars note that public outrage and 
disapproval for corruption is not limited to the salacious characterization of corruption scandals 
in the media. Yufan Hao and Michael Johnston contend that as Chinese political and economic 
environments become more open due to the various reforms of recent history, the public has 
greater expectations, and thus disappointment, with their political system. Hao and Johnston note 
that “there is popular outrage over corruption in the political setting” and an overwhelming 
“discontent coexists with a limited tolerance for other varieties of corrupt conduct in a system in 
which it is often unclear just what is corruption and what is reform.”50 For Hao and Johnston, 
outrage at corruption exists throughout Chinese society, mostly prevalent due to changes in the 
reform era. Regardless of its source, public anger at corruption receives considerable study in 
corruption literature.  
Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption Campaigns 
The various anticorruption campaigns in China’s history pale in comparison to the 
anticorruption initiatives under Xi Jinping’s leadership of the CCP. Scholars concur that the 
short-range anticorruption campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s had minimal effect on lessening 
systemic corruption. In 2012, Xi Jinping relaunched a Maoist ‘rectification’ initiative to tackle 
the evils of the ‘Four Winds’ (formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, waste).51 Andrew Wedeman 
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argues that consolidating public support behind Maoist traditions has been central to the success 
of Xi Jinping’s anticorruption initiatives. Xi Jinipng’s well-publicized campaigns are essentially 
Maoist-like revivals that reaffirm the traditional values of the CCP. 52 While previous 
rectification campaigns targeted wide ranges of society, Xi Jinping’s anticorruption reforms 
appear to highlight abuses within the CCP. Yufan Hao and Michael Johnston note that the 
Maoist mass campaigns viewed corruption as an individual wrongdoing rather than as an 
institutional or systemic problem.53 While highlighting corrupt party members may target various 
CCP members, Xi Jinping’s anticorruption initiatives address corruption as a systemic, rather 
than an individual problem. Scholarly literature frequently references the connections between 
traditional Maoist rectification campaigns and Xi Jinping’s anticorruption initiatives as a 
proponent of their success.   
While there is significant scholarly consensus regarding the Maoist influences on Xi 
Jinping's anticorruption campaigns, there are diverging opinions on these initiatives' underlying 
designs. Despite the irrefutability of corruption's negative impact on a nation's economic and 
political stability, Xi Jinping’s motivation for undertaking this radical restructuring is uncertain. 
Two primary schools of thought emerge: anticorruption initiatives are employed to target 
political rivals or to fortify the legitimacy of the CCP. Thomas Heberer argues that Xi Jinping’s 
corruption campaigns are primarily a function of consolidating the current leadership’s power.54 
Heberer also comments that this consolidation of power is a selective fight, since the leadership 
decides who and whose networks are to be regarded as corrupt.55 Most scholars use the cases of 
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former Chongqing Party Chief Bo Xilai, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Xu Caihou, 
and former Politburo Standing Committee Member Zhong Yongkang as evidence of the biased 
nature of Xi Jinping’s corruption campaigns. Robert Broadhurst notes that Xi Jinping employs 
anticorruption campaigns to achieve short-term political goals by neutralizing rivals, despite 
risking further tensions.56 Throughout academic literature, numerous scholars make effective 
arguments for the biased nature of those prosecuted by Xi Jinping’s corruption reforms. 
While the elimination of political rivals is a likely objective of recent anticorruption 
initiatives, some scholars argue that these reforms pursue broader aspirations. Specifically, Xi 
Jinping’s anticorruption initiatives seek the broader goal of legitimizing the CCP. Shaomin Li 
argues that anticorruption campaigns garner Xi Jinping invaluable political capital with the 
general population.57 John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett comment that anticorruption 
campaigns can both reign in the bureaucracy and enhance CCP legitimacy in the eyes of the 
general public.58 While the removal of problematic politicians can assist in building Party 
legitimacy, Garrick and Bennet also argue that the selective mobilization of key law reforms, like 
corruption, has the effect of negating the potential for alternative discourses.59 As the CCP 
attempts to maintain control of society and strengthen public support in the face of growing 
criticism, fortifying the legitimacy of the CCP is imperative. Dimitar Gueorguiev notes that Xi 
Jinping’s policy priorities arguably say less about his hunger for power than it does about his 
concern about upsetting the semblance of institutional legitimacy.60 Xi Jinping’s anticorruption 
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initiatives are publicly popular and politically effective tools to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
CCP.  
Throughout academic literature, there are countless interpretations of the political agenda 
of the CCP under the leadership of Xi Jinping. While China's global ambitions are readily 
apparent, the implications of internal societal factors on achieving this ambitious political agenda 
are still uncertain. Despite the Xi Jinping era's anticorruption initiatives, systemic corruption in 
China negatively affects political, economic, and social developments. Additionally, by 
empowering the authority of the central government through attacks on Xi Jinping’s rivals, the 
CCPs anticorruption campaigns support endemic corruption and Xi Jinping’s nationalist agenda. 
Environmental Civil Society  
Inaugurated at the CCPs 17th National Congress, the ethos of an ecological civilization 
quickly became a central focus of the CCP. While the CCP historically addresses environmental 
concerns as merely a small facet of its grandiose political agenda, the 17th (2007) and 18th 
(2012) National Congresses codified environmental conservation as an essential component of 
China's long-term global ambitions. The passage of stricter environmental legislation and various 
bureaucratic reforms, and a publicly popular--albeit seemingly unattainable--emissions targets 
support this theoretical ecological civilization. A rising number of widespread environmental 
protests, effective domestic and foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and media 
publicity targeting a generation of environmentally conscious Chinese creates a formidable 
environmental civil society supportive of the idealistic tenants of the CCPs ecological 
civilization. While the rising number of environmentally conscious organizations and 
ecologically conscious government policies are indicators of an increasingly influential 
environmental civil society, they also support China's rise within the international hierarchy by 
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mirroring other first-world nations' environmental standards. While robust, China's 
environmental civil society is a small component of China's broader goals to redefine its global 
image as a leader in ecological reforms. Ultimately, China's growing environmental 
consciousness is the result of a civil society immeasurably influenced by the nationalist policies 
of the CCP under Xi Jinping. 
Perceptions of Environmental Civil Society in China 
 Some scholars characterize civil society in China as incredibly robust, despite 
government restrictions. For example, Jonathan Schwartz argues that environmental civil society 
is increasingly influential due to civil society activism from non-state actors such as NGOs and 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Because the state recognizes the need for an alternative to 
state intervention, the CCP turns to non-state actors to carry some of the environmental 
protection burdens.61 While Schwartz argues that the Chinese government consciously relies on 
non-state actors to advocate for environmental concerns, Bonny Ling, Wing Lam, Elisabeth 
Wickeri, and Tina Tan attribute civil society's success to its role as a mediator between the 
people and the government. Specifically, they comment that environmental civil society is 
flourishing because it serves as a mediator for societal tensions and a channel for the peaceful 
airing of grievances.62 According to Elizabeth Economy, the growing influence of environmental 
civil society hints at larger phenomena. Economy writes that China’s robust environmental civil 
society—through the growing influence of NGOs and CSOs—indicates an ongoing 
transformation of state-societal relations.63 China’s burgeoning environmental community 
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employs the influence of other CSOs to foster closer ties between the government and the 
people. Ultimately, there is a prominent scholarly consensus that civil society is a considerable 
social force in Chinese life.  
 Despite abundant academic literature arguing that China's environmental civil society is 
flourishing, some scholars offer a contradictory interpretation. For instance, Phillip Stalley and 
Dongning Yang contend that there is no widespread network of environmental organizations in 
China. Stalley and Yang note that despite the immense media attention given to protests, very 
little of China’s environmental activity is contentious; most protests are spontaneous responses to 
isolated incidents.64 The underlying theme of China’s inability to foster a true environmental 
movement is the population’s resounding belief that the Chinese government can solve all 
problems, primarily via economic growth. Like Stalley and Yang decry claims of robust Chinese 
environmental civil society, Samson Yuen argues that the CCP’s widespread social repression 
during Xi Jinping’s tenure prohibits the creation of a meaningful environmental movement. 
While Yuen credits civil society’s ability to adapt and avoid crackdowns, this optimism falls 
short of supporting measurable growth in environmental civil society.65 Jie Chen describes a 
balancing act of environmental civil society in a still restrained civic space, where NGOs and 
CSOs advocate for topics based largely on their judgment of the risks and opportunities from the 
central government.66 While highly publicized protests, successful media campaigns, and 
endurance in the face of mounting government repression are testaments to civil society's 
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durability in China, many scholars ultimately argue that a national movement is both unfeasible 
and unsustainable. 
Environmental Civil Society and the CCP 
By analyzing the interactions between environmental civil society and the CCP, some 
scholars maintain that local governments retain the most bargaining power. Specifically, 
environmental organizations interact with and are at the mercy of local government authorities. 
Lei Xie and Hein-Anton Van Der Heijden argue that resources and authority at the provincial 
level determine the performance of local governments in environmental management.67 While 
the ultimate authority of the CCP is expansive, as Ka Zeng and Joshua Eastin note, the CCPs 
failure to enforce uniform oversight of environmental regulations in local governments fosters 
both a lack of cross-provincial conformity and confusion.68 Li Xiaofan echoes this concern, 
commenting that instead of supporting environmental protection regulations, local governments 
protect business interests, fail to coordinate with agencies, and increase bureaucratic confusion.69 
These analyses of local governments' autonomy are contradictory to the current narrative of the 
CCP which focuses on the authority of the central government in all facets of political and social 
life. Unfortunately, employing the scholars' interpretations mentioned above, environmental 
regulations and civil society in China are at the mercy of inattentive local governments.  
While some scholars assert that local governments' influence hampers the development of 
environmental civil society and regulations, other scholars maintain that local governments are 
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subject to the central government's whims. Therefore, local governments strictly enforce the will 
of the CCP. For example, Jonathan Schwartz comments that civil society is state-led, and 
cooperates with, rather than opposes, the central state.70 Schwartz also argues that the central 
government is invested in strengthening the environmental protection powers of the 
environmental protection bureaucracy. If environmental protection agencies are adequately 
empowered, they will likely continue to align themselves with the central government's agenda. 
While the central government opposes any erosion to their power over local governments, they 
will ultimately secede influence to civil society organizations who support the CCPs agenda. 
Yifei Li and Judith Shapiro view the CCPs agenda as the realization of authoritarian 
environmentalism, the use of authoritarian methods to accomplish environmental goals.71 Under 
this authoritarian environmentalism, environmental issues are all held within the scope of the 
centralized leadership of the CCP. While inputs from non-state actors (CSOs, NGOs) and 
oversight by local governments influence the development and enforcement of environmental 
regulations, the CCP ultimately reigns supreme. 
Many scholars contend that the Party's fears of social upheaval invariably influence their 
attempts to control China's environmental civil society.  Elizabeth Economy and Peter Ho argue 
that a formidable environmental civil society could serve as a destabilizing force and a vessel for 
societal discontent. Economy and Ho both reference environmental civil society's influence in 
the final years of the former Soviet Union as a cautionary tale. This environmental movement 
was also linked to wider issues of human rights and democracy.72 While Ho argues that a 
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crackdown on specific social movements could coincide with relaxations in other realms of 
society (environmentalism). Guobin Yang argues that environmental civil society takes 
advantage of the CCPs fears of their future influence. Specifically, Yang comments that 
environmental CSOs thrive on their political ambiguity.73 While many environmental CSOs take 
heed to operate apolitically or align themselves with CCP directives, their continued existence 
without explicit political aims may still be political.74 Their continued existence--despite fear-
based Party intervention--proves that civil society can both exist and thrive in China. Effective 
environmental CSOs adeptly circumvent CCP regulations while simultaneously fulfilling Party 
fears of fomenting a gradual political and social awakening in China. 
Environmental Protest Movements 
Despite various influences from government and civilian entities and mounting pressure 
from local and central governments, China’s environmental CSOs have supported an array of 
protest movements since the 1990s. There is considerable attention paid toward the interactions 
between environmental protests and the central government throughout academic literature. 
Specifically, many scholars contend that recent environmental protests are successful only 
because they work within the confines of government restrictions to enact change. Elizabeth 
Economy and Peter Ho specifically identify protest efforts at the Three Gorges Dam and the 
Nujiang River as indicative of this concept. While both protests had opposite outcomes, they 
ultimately exemplify a low-cost approach. Ho notes that the CSOs working on these protest 
movements courted government approval and influence in policymaking rather than seeking a 
potentially dangerous confrontation with the national state.75 According to Lei Xie and Hein-
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Anton Van Der Heijden, Friends of Nature--the oldest and most influential environmental CSO 
in China--heavily supported these protest movements. Coincidentally, Friends of Nature has 
gained CCP support, remained socially relevant, and operated effectively under CCP mandates 
for decades due to their advocacy for minimally controversial issues. To continue operating in 
China, environmental CSOs generally support protest movements that are regionally focused, 
lack controversy, and fail to threaten the CCP central authority. 
In addition to courting CCP approval, many contemporary protest movements also 
involve large swatches of society. Christoph Steinhardt and Fengshi Wu note that the regionally 
focused protests of the 2000s notably reached beyond the intellectual elite for support.76  
Scholars credit the Nujiang River protests in 2003 as one of the first incidents of environmental 
activism that incorporated various social classes. The anti-paraxylene protests in Xiamen and 
Maoming in 2007 and 2014 included nearly universal support from the local population, 
regardless of social class. Elizabeth Economy argues that the Xiamen protests were perhaps the 
first genuine parade--involving 7,000 to 20,000 citizens at its height-since Tiananmen Square.77 
Kingsyhon Lee and Ming-Sho Ho comment that the Maoming protests, specifically, resorted to 
direct action due to the lack of international and domestic NGO resources.78 Academic literature 
frequently references the Nujiang River, Xiamen, and Maoming protests as titular events in 
signaling environmental protests' mass appeal. Despite both the local and central government's 
attempts to stifle environmental activism, recent protests reveal that a diverse segment of the 
 
76 Christoph Steinhardt and Fengshi Wu, “In the Name of the Public: Environmental Protest and the Changing 
Landscape of Popular Contention in China,” China Journal 75, no. 1 (January 2016), 70, accessed January 23, 2021, 
doi:10.1086/684010. 
77 Elizabeth C. Economy. “The Great Leap Backward?” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (September 2007), 39, accessed 
January 18, 2021, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=asn&AN=26258099 
&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
78 Kingsyhon Lee and Ming-Sho Ho, "The Maoming Anti-PX Protest of 2014: An Environmental Movement in 




Chinese population is willing to voice their concerns against environmental degradation or 
overuse.  
Xi Jinping’s Ecological Civilization 
The CCPs repeated use of the phrase ecological civilization indicates China’s 
prioritization of environmental issues in the twenty-first century. Since assuming leadership of 
the Party in 2013, Xi Jinping references a Chinese ecological civilization both in his public 
speeches and political doctrine.  From the array of academic literature analyzing this concept, a 
common theme emerges: the ecological civilization is both a fulfillment of the past and a vision 
for the future. Shakeel Ahmad Ramay maintains that the legal execution of the ecological 
civilization integrates traditional Chinese views of nature with a modern perspective of economic 
advancement.79 Policies related to China’s ecological civilization are formulated to demonstrate 
how environmentalism is built on the past but its anticipated achievement is projected into the 
future, according to Maurizio Marinelli.80 Marinelli also maintains that the ecological 
civilization—fully realized under Xi Jinping’s leadership—highlights environmental 
advancement with a stronger sense of urgency.81 This sense of urgency reinforces that China can 
only overcome its past failures through the promise of a successful future. According to Coraline 
Goron, the notion of an ecological civilization is a central positive narrative within Xi Jinping’s 
China Dream.82 Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the notion of an ecological civilization becomes 
the irrefutable link between China’s past and its ambitious future.  
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While analysis of ecological civilization through the lens of China’s future aspirations is 
common, scholars also scrutinize the relationship between ecological civilization and economic 
development. Many maintain that the CCP champions a narrative where sustained economic 
growth is impossible without environmental protection. Specifically, Li Xiaofan writes, if 
China’s economy continues to grow and facilitate socio-economic changes, then the Chinese 
population will be more likely to support the broad initiatives of ecological civilization.83 As the 
policies and reforms associated with the ecological civilization transform into foundational 
aspects of Chinese society, then the ultimate goal to facilitate sustainable development and 
harmony between man and nature will be achieved, according to Li Meng.84 Scholars generally 
contend that the ecological civilization's promise cannot be fully realized until China reconciles 
its quest for economic growth with sound environmental practices. Maurizio Marinelli describes 
the disparity between economic advancement and sustainability; China's real challenge is how to 
de-couple economic growth from environmental degradation.85 Ultimately, many scholars 
maintain that China must reconcile the ecological civilization with its quest to be a world 
economic power.  
Throughout academic literature, there are a multitude of analyses concerning modern 
environmentalism in China. While some scholars maintain that environmental civil society is a 
vital and foundational aspect of Chinese culture, other scholars argue that China’s authoritarian 
tendencies inhibit the formation of any influential environmental civil society. The increasing 




83 Li, 47.  
84 Li Meng, “Ecological Civilization Spearheads High-Quality Development in China.” China Today 68 (2019), 43, 
accessed January 26, 2021, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip, 
shib&db=asn&AN=137650325&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
85 Marinelli, 383.  
34 
 
from Chinese environmental groups. While there is abundant literature related to the restrictions 
on CSOs since the tenure of Xi Jinping, the analysis concerning the larger narrative of ecological 
civilization is lacking. Ultimately, an understanding of the state of environmental civil society in 
China and the multitude of implications of Xi Jinping’s singular take on the ecological 


























Coercive National Unity: Nationalism and 
Muslim Minority Rights in India and China 
 
India and China are not only preeminent powers in Asia, but they are also rising powers 
within the global community. Apart from their geopolitical prominence, their respective political 
structures, population demographics, and cultural narratives are each unique. India is the world’s 
largest democracy, with a history of prioritizing the development of democratic institutions. 
Conversely, the egalitarian origins of the ruling CCP diverge, and the Party increasingly favors 
autocracy under the guise of promoting prosperity and unity. While only 72% of India’s 
population classifies as Indo-Aryan, China is overwhelmingly 92% Han Chinese. The 
constitutions of both nations promote religious freedom. Yet, India wrestles with secularism in 
the face of a substantial Hindu majority and China aggressively promotes reverence to the state 
as superior to any religious affiliation. Despite these foundational differences, India and China 
are overwhelmingly similar.  Both contemporary nations were founded during the post-WWII 
period of global uncertainty (India in 1947 and the PRC in 1949), and they each created 
governments radically different from their predecessors. These novel governments touted their 
promotion of equality as the antithesis of their corrupt forebears who were either colonial 
oppressors, foreign invaders, or native sons unduly influenced by alien powers. Although both 
India and China publicize their promotion of equality, their present treatment of ethnic 
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minorities, especially the Muslim populations, is lacking. Specifically, the Uighur’s of China's 
Xinjiang region and the Muslims of the semi-autonomous Indian state of Kashmir are recipients 
of systematic political oppression.  
The Muslim experience in India and China is indicative of a significant disparity between 
each nation’s political structure and their respective minority rights policies. While democracy is 
characterized by democratic consensus, an authoritarian state is characterized by repression. 
Although China officially identifies as a communist nation, its political and social repression is 
reminiscent of an authoritarian state. To understand how two countries with antithetical 
ideologies—democratic consensus and authoritarian repression—possess similar minority rights 
policies, an examination of their shared goals and philosophies is imperative. This paper will 
proceed in assessing these shared goals and philosophies in three parts. First, a discussion of the 
theories of nationalism and minority rights will provide an overview for both India and China’s 
present frameworks. Second, an analysis of the recurring themes of secularism and communal 
identity in politics supports similar minority rights policies in both nations. Finally, this paper 
will use an assessment of the current crises of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang and Kashmir to 
better understand the present nationalistic ideologies of India and China. As India and China 
continue to gain prominence in both Asia and the global community, an understanding of the 
societal implications of limiting minority rights is imperative to understanding the scope of each 
nation’s nationalistic sentiment and its potential influence on the world order. Ultimately, India 
and China’s Muslim minority rights policies represent a fabricated modern nationalist ethos 
intended to enforce national unity.  
Theories of Nationalism  
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An examination of the existing interpretations of nationalism, ethnic identity, and 
minority rights is necessary to understand India and China’s respective approaches to 
nationalism. Who comprises and what constitutes a nation determines nationalism studies. 
According to the myriad of theories on nationalism, the nation-state is the catalyst for the 
development of nationalist sentiment.  To some theorists, the nation-state exists purely from an 
imagined political community, which is both inherently limited and sovereign.86 This community 
is imagined because all its members can never conceivably meet, yet they are still united behind 
similar languages, cultures, or opinions. The community is limited because it has finite 
membership and is sovereign because it can, in some instances, assert autonomy. The imagined 
community creates not only a national consciousness, but also the tangible borders and policies 
of modern nation-states. In addition to an imagined community, nations are also founded upon 
the abstract notions of privileged classes. Whether it is a physical boundary or an ideological 
community, nations exist from the moment a handful of influential people decide it should be 
so.87 To be an efficient political tool, however, nations must possess mass appeal.88 When groups 
of similar cultures form communities where their wants and needs are addressed in a broader 
social system, a combination of privileged class power and mass appeal occurs. Eventually, 
people’s loyalties and attachments are directed towards the state and legislative systems rather 
than towards members of their kin group or village.89 The theoretical origins of nations—both 
the communities from which they originate and the driving forces which support them—affect 
present perceptions of nationalism. 
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 From the study of defining nations, three schools of thought emerged in nationalism: 
primordialism (traditional), modernism, and state-centric constructivism. Primordialists maintain 
that ethnic identity is fundamental to the development of a nation and nationalism. Modern 
nations originate from pre-existing ethnies (ethnic communities) and nationalisms can thus draw 
on ethnic sentiments and shared memories, myths, symbols and values.90 Transcending gender, 
class, profession, religion or any other experience which fosters solidarity,91 ethnic identity is the 
ultimate unifier. Eventually, ethnies will form nations via immigration, the creation of an ethnic 
nation, or bureaucratic incorporation into existing states. These nations were created by not only 
united ethnies, but also by the conditions of both the pre-modern and modern world which 
facilitated change. The evolution of power dynamics, armed conflicts, technological 
advancements, and demographic changes have affected the global community. Thus, modern 
nations are both manifestations of historic cultural identities and responses to contemporary 
problems.  
While primordialism views historic ethnic identities as the central influencers of 
nationalism, modernists maintain that nationalism is purely a modern phenomenon. A principle 
of political legitimacy,92 nationalism exists due to the shifting balances of power, 
industrialization, mass migrations, traumas of regional and global conflicts, and ideological shifts 
characteristic of only modernity. Although ethnic identity may still play a role in nationalism, to 
modernists, nationalism is simply the result of the modern changes these ethnic identities 
experienced. To modernists, nationalism reflects the basic social organization of the industrial 
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world and industrializing people.93  In the industrial world, widespread literacy and an emphasis 
on formal education fostered the creation of both modern cultural and societal unification. 
Because of these contemporary phenomena, nationalism became a marriage of state and 
culture.94 Relatively absent in the static social units of pre-modern times, the cultural 
homogenization of modernity because of free-moving people and ideas creates a distinct 
nationalism for the present age. It is modern culture, not ethnic identity, which influences the 
development of nationalism in contemporary society.    
Like modernism, the state-centric constructivist view applies the lens of modernity to its 
analysis of nationalism development. By examining the fundamental societal changes during 
France’s Third Republic (1870-1914), Eugen Weber concludes that nations are the creations of 
effective nation-states. Despite France’s lengthy and storied history, France’s national identity 
did not manifest until its construction by the French republic and modernity's influences. Modern 
services produced or supported by the French government such as roads, railroads, schools, 
markets, military service, and the circulation of money, goods and printed matter provided 
shared experiences, swept away old commitments, instilled a national view of things in regional 
minds, and confirmed the power of that view by offering advancement to those who adopted it.95 
Through acculturation—the civilization of the French by urban France, the disintegration of local 
cultures by modernity and their absorption into the dominant civilization—the French 
experienced a shared communal identity.96 This acculturation, however, could not occur without 
the realities of modernity. While global conflicts, industrialization, and social mobility are 
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arguably by-products of modern society, Weber argues that the advancements constructed by 
modern nation-states—education, technology, infrastructure—contribute to national shared 
identity. The state-centric constructivist school maintains that the political goals of modern 
nation-states fabricate contemporary nationalism.   
Despite their differences, the primordial, modern, and state-centric constructivist schools 
of thought maintain that ethnic identity exerts varying degrees of influence on nationalism. To 
further address the effects of ethnicity on nationality, two broad schools of thought can be 
assessed: civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Comprehensive studies of ethnic nationalism 
were first articulated by the 18th century German thinkers Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte. Collectively, these scholars championed the idea that shared ethnicity, culture, 
race, or history facilitate creating a nation, thus establishing the hereditary and exclusive nature 
of inclusion into the ethnic group that serves as a nation’s foundation.97 While ethnic nationalism 
focuses on the unchangeable cultural, ethnic, geographic, or religious similarities of a specified 
people, civic nationalism highlights the citizen’s inalienable right to select, prefer, or identify 
with a specified nationalism. Specifically, civic nationalism maintains that national identity is 
purely political: it is nothing but the individual’s choice to belong to a community based on the 
association of like-minded individuals.98 During its developmental phase in the 18th century, 
civic nationalism was strongly associated with the ideologies of the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution. Citizens possessed the free will to identify with the revolutionary ideals of 
the French republic rather than remain confined to their inclusion into a nation based on their 
inherent ethnic or cultural histories. Discourses on civic and ethnic nationalism propel 
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contemporary conversations on whether a nation is the creation of human ideologies or the 
inherent manifestation of ethnic or cultural ties. 
Unfortunately, the realities of integrating ethnicity and nationalist thought into 
governance breeds inherent difficulties. According to some theorists, the most critical issue in 
the study of nationalism today is how to reconcile cultural diversity and political unity within the 
state.99 While multiculturalism and ethnic diversity do not guarantee societal discord, the union 
of culture and state in ethnically diverse nations will invariably experience conflict. The presence 
of religious, linguistic, or ethnic minorities in a state, however, are natural sources of conflict in a 
dynamic modern world.100 Additionally, because most nationalisms are ethnic in character, the 
kindred concepts of nationalism and ethnicity may experience social strife.101 This strife affects 
both majority and minority groups who experience alienation when the state fails to protect their 
respective identities. To ensure both groups are accommodated, communities must both 
acknowledge and accept these cultural or ethnic differences. When societies lack confidence in 
the government’s ability to respect these ethnic differences, nationalism and divisiveness 
occur.102 Thus, minority rights decrease because of government inaction and social discord.  
Nationalism in India and China since the nineteenth century possesses immense 
influences from the inherent tensions between ethnic identity and primordial, modern, and state-
centric constructivist theories of nationalism. When Great Britain began colonizing the Indian 
subcontinent in the 1700s, India was populated, ethnically diverse, and characterized by 
numerous principalities who only rarely unified throughout India's lengthy history. While the 
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Indian Rebellion of 1857 successfully transferred the region's control from the East India 
Company to the British Raj—a separate realm of Great Britain—many of the attempts to assert 
Indian autonomy were episodic, scattered, and minute in comparison to the more extensive 
British colonial infrastructure. Despite unification under the British crown, administrative unity 
imposed from above was entirely different from political unity, which is an essential 
characteristic of nationhood.103 The Indian National Congress’s (INC) establishment in 1885 to 
assert Indian concerns within the British Raj provided a powerful outlet for Indian political 
concerns. The growing Indian upper and middle classes—divided amongst those ambitious for 
political independence and those protective of the financial security of British oversight—as well 
as the social and political upheaval of World War I facilitated the creation of a formidable Indian 
nationalist movement in the early twentieth century. 
Tension between the largely Hindu INC and the Muslim League characterized the Indian 
nationalist movement which developed in the 1920s and 1930s. While Mahatma Gandhi and the 
younger generation of INC leaders argued for an inclusive and integrative concept of anti-
colonial populist nationalism, the Muslim League rapidly moved from a position of advocating 
the Muslim community’s political interests within a single overarching nationalist movement to a 
position advocating the claim for a separate sovereign Muslim state through a partition of 
India.104 To its opposition, the INC’s aspirations for a secular, post-colonial India did not 
adequately account for its vast ethno-religious diversity.105 Gandhi’s immense popularity and 
political effectiveness combined with additional social upheaval after World War II, facilitated 
complete Indian independence from Great Britain in 1947. Thus, in 1947, India’s nationalist 
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debate effectively refocused from a fixation with political autonomy to the urgency of 
reconciling India’s proposed secular character with the realities of governing an ethnically, 
religiously, and socially diverse nation-state. While the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan 
facilitated majority-minority violence, the tension between India’s two largest religious groups—
Hindus and Muslims—continues to characterize the realities of nationalist debates on India’s 
historical past and its secular nationalist identity today.  
Like India, contemporary Chinese nationalism is invariably influenced by the nation’s 
first experiences with the Western world. The Chinese nationalism originating from the century 
of humiliation and the brief Nationalist government in the early twentieth century was not merely 
about celebrating the glories of Chinese civilization; it also commemorated China’s 
weaknesses.106 Despite multiple periods of upheaval and foreign subjugation during its lengthy 
dynastic history, China’s final dynasty—the Qing dynasty—was wholly unprepared to relinquish 
its position as the cultural and political center of Asia and thus, in their estimation, the world at 
the arrival of technologically superior Western nations in the nineteenth century. The West's 
unequal treaties imposed on the Qing Dynasty after the Opium Wars and nation's defeat by its 
historic rival (Japan) in the Sino-Japanese wars devastated the Qing Dynasty's conceptions of 
Chinese superiority. Acutely aware that China under the Qing Dynasty was no longer the center 
of the universe, the political figures of the nineteenth century grappled with abandoning China’s 
historic perceptions of their global preeminence in pursuit of a worldview that would allow 
China to adapt to modern times.   
While this emphasis on national humiliation, or guochi, created in the nineteenth century 
may seem negative, to Chinese ears the implication is that the Chinese, defined as descendants of 
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the Yellow Emperor, are the heirs of a glorious civilization that will eventually recover their 
preeminence.107 As witnesses to the perceived ineptitudes of the Qing Dynasty and multiple 
defeats by the foreign powers, reformers such as Ling Qichao, Sun Yat-Sen, and Kang Youwei 
championed an ideology which both glorified China’s past and set ambitions for its future. The 
Nationalist reformers held that the superior nationality, or minzu, was invariably linked to the 
first successful Han Emperor of the Qin dynasty, thus fortifying the pre-existing Chinese notion 
of national privilege to the Han Chinese majority.108 Inspired by the Japanese approach of 
embracing modern technology without adopting foreign (i.e. liberal) political, social, or cultural 
arrangements, the Nationalist reformers also championed technical modernizations and 
prioritized economic growth.109 After the numerous defeats during the century of humiliation, the 
Nationalists were dedicated to bringing substantial, effective, and profitable advancements to 
China. This desire to bring change to China in the pursuit of wealth and power was a rational, 
progressive, and developmental nationalism which focused on resolving fundamental economic 
problems as well as on promoting social, cultural, and political change.110 During the Republic of 
China’s existence from 1912-1949, Nationalists leaders espoused a nationalism that highlighted 
the need for economic and societal modernization while simultaneously empowering the 
perceived primacy of the Han ethnic minority. 
Despite their ambitions for China’s future, the Nationalist’s control of a newly unified 
China was tenuous, at best. Their failure to deliver prompt political cohesion, social change, and 
economic advancements led to their defeat at the hands of the Communist forces in 1949. Upon 
 
107 Jacqueline Newmyer Deal, "China's Nationalist Heritage," The National Interest, no. 123 (2013): 48, accessed 
May 1, 2021, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896536. 
108 Deal, 48.  
109 Ibid, 48.  
110 Guoguang, 478.  
45 
 
founding the PRC, Mao Zedong (Chairman Mao) championed a Chinese nationalism focused 
solely on the tenants of a Chinese Communist Revolution. For Chairman Mao, his revolution 
trumped restoration as the national priority, though he did appropriate the Nationalist’s ethos of 
comparing China to a heap of “loose sand” requiring unification.111 While the CCPs disastrous 
attempts at economic modernization during the Great Leap Forward and social restructuring with 
the Cultural Revolution proved ultimately financially ineffective and psychologically damaging, 
they did indoctrinate generations of Chinese citizens into the Party’s prioritization of a 
continuous revolution and dedication to the State. After Chairman Mao’s death and Deng 
Xiaoping’s gradual opening of China’s economic, social, and physical isolation in 1979, the 
CCPs Communist revolution continued, albeit on a broader, modern, and globally ambitious 
scale. Specifically, whereas in the early twentieth century the Chinese merely sought wealth and 
power, on the threshold of achieving it at its close new nationalist concerns emerged: how should 
China manage its rise and its challenge to the status quo in the international order?112 China’s 
transformation from an insular nation singularly focused on Communist revolution in the mid-
twentieth century to an economic powerhouse contemplating global hegemony in the late 
twentieth century supported a contemporary nationalism reverent to China’s cultural and 
political past while simultaneously focused upon future aspirations.  
 Theories on nationalism, ethnic identity, and minority rights are integral to an overall 
analysis of nationalism in India and China. Additionally, a comprehensive understanding of both 
nation’s historical views on nationalism is imperative to understanding the modern nationalism 
developing today and its potential implications for divisive issues. While historically diverse and 
influential in Asia since antiquity, both India and China’s unsuccessful approaches to 
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assimilating Muslim minorities is a distinctly modern phenomenon. Much like modernists views 
nationalism as a response to the singular difficulties of modernity, nationalism in India and 
China is a response to contemporary issues which facilitate increased ethnic divisions. In 
attempts to achieve regional, and eventually, global hegemony, both nations prioritized 
aggressive growth in their economic, industrial, and military sectors over social cohesion. 
Additionally, both India and China expanded their territorial influences by exerting increasing 
control over autonomous regions, specifically the states of Kashmir and Xinjiang. As a result of 
these territorial encroachments, economic investments increased in conjunction with the 
migration of majority groups to Muslim minority regions. Subsequently, the influence of India 
and China increased within Asia and the global community, albeit at the expense of internal 
unity. The reconciliation of modern progress and traditional culture positively impacted the 
majority population while further subjugating the Muslim minorities. Ultimately, this divide 
continues to fuel majority nationalism at the expense of the Muslim minorities.  
Legal Applications of Secularism and Communal Identity 
 Both India and China’s modern interpretations of nationalism draw influences from their 
respective histories. Their struggles during the twentieth century, specifically, impacts their 
contemporary nationalist policies. To many of its citizens, the British raj abandoned India’s 
identity as a Hindu majority nation and formidable socio-political power in Asia during its tenure 
from 1858 until 1947. Following independence in 1947, India’s founders sought to assert their 
burgeoning influence with a political system that could reflect their evolving values. The Indian 
republic would eliminate the perceived religious and cultural intolerances of the British raj. 
India’s founders sought not only to afford themselves the freedoms lost under British colonial 
rule, but also to eradicate the fears of a majority hegemony by providing special status to 
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minorities.113 They effectively combined Great Britain’s example of parliamentary democracy 
and secularism with a distinctly Indian approach emphasizing the integration of a multicultural 
and multiethnic society with the Hindu majority. Additionally, India’s founders maintained that 
democracy and secularism should not be seen as merely confined to the sphere of government 
and state, but also as the governing principle of collective life in society.114 Ultimately, as the 
basis for governance, secularism has been critical to the success of Indian democracy.115 By 
creating an institutionalized space for political, cultural, and religious expression, democracy and 
secularism became the cornerstones of Indian society and, thus protectors of Muslim 
communities.  
 Like modern India’s origin narrative, a blend of traditional cultural identity, reaction to 
previous governmental structures, and modern secularism govern China. After the fall of the 
Qing dynasty in 1912, a brief period of Republicanism followed by increased influence from 
Western powers occurred. These events precipitated the need for a political structure which both 
acknowledged the singularity of the Chinese people and was a departure from the failures of the 
past. Specifically, the founders of the PRC emphasized a national identity heavily influenced by 
the Han majority's communal structure.116 Influenced in part by the traditional Confucian 
emphasis on familial unity, the Han majority's communal structure also draws heavily upon 
modern China’s political inspiration: the Soviet Union. The Chinese two-pronged strategy of 
containment and absorption of minority groups draws heavily from Josef Stalin’s policies in the 
1950s.117 By containing the spread of minority group’s independence and indoctrinating those 
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groups into the broader national identity, the Soviet Union, and eventually China, created distinct 
communal identities. Lenin’s view that the proletariat must consolidate minorities into the larger 
community, thus diminishing any separatist desires, also influenced this ideology.118 Secession 
by minority political groups led to the destabilization and eventual dissolution of the Soviet 
Union from 1989-1991. This breakdown not only diminished the Soviet Union's global power, 
but also supported pre-existing fears in China that minority groups could eventually undermine 
national progress.119 Thus, the Soviet Union inspired the political foundation of the PRC while 
also serving as a cautionary tale of the dangers of minority groups.  
The prioritization of secularism and communal identity in India and China influences the 
implementation of these ideologies into law. India, specifically, enforces secularism via the 
Indian Constitution while reaffirming this synthetic identity through robust political discourse.120 
To support a secular political discourse, India has a lengthy history of prioritizing civic 
involvement and emphasizing multicultural unity. Following its independence in 1947, India 
guaranteed suffrage to all citizens regardless of gender, race, or religion. While India is 
predominantly Hindu, it has no official religion. Additionally, to effectively consolidate an 
ethnically diverse nation, India’s founders organized states on linguistic grounds and granted 
considerable regional autonomy. To emphasize secularism, the Preamble of the Constitution 
describes India as a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic. Additionally, Articles 14-18 
guarantee fundamental rights to all citizens, regardless of religion, while Articles 25-28 are the 
constitutional provisions that underpin the secularity of the Indian state.121 Article 25, 
specifically, states that all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to 
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freely profess, practice, and propagate religion subject to public order, morality and health.122 
While India attempts to regulate secularism on a national scale, they largely defer to regional 
states for implementation and enforcement of minority rights laws. Because India is ethnically 
diverse, each state applies its own regional biases or viewpoints to implementing minority 
protections. To ensure constitutional safeguards were in union with rapidly diverging provincial 
laws, the National Commission for Minorities Act in 1992 established a national body to ensure 
compliance. Although regional governments have been the primary arbitrators of minority 
relations since India’s inception, the federal government plays a more significant role in 
enforcing Constitutional secularism in recent years.  
Like India, China strives to combine its emphasis on secularism and communal identity 
with effective minority policies. Minority policies focus on ethnic groups, or minzu, vice 
religious affiliation. The policy’s framework remains like Mao Zedong’s initiatives in the 1950s 
to institutionalize the special status of minzu. To inspire eventual assimilation into the Han 
majority population, minority groups receive disproportionately high representation in political 
bodies, looser restrictions on family planning, and other benefits. Per the Chinese Constitution, 
each minzu is classified based on four criteria: common territory, language, economy, and 
psychological nature as manifested in common culture.123 There are approximately 55 official 
recognized minority groups in China, with the largest having more than 15 million members.124 
Only in autonomous districts where they are registered, can minzu receive the benefits afforded 
to them. Coincidentally, China’s migrant population is mainly ethnic minorities who abandoned 
their underfunded economically stagnant provinces in search of economic stability in Eastern 
 
122 Article 25, Indian Constitution.  
123 Yuan, 135. 
124 Postiglione, 259. 
50 
 
cities. Thus, minority policy is territorially bound.125 Despite political protections, state 
propaganda for huaxia zisun (descendants of the Han nucleus) and Huangdi (the Yellow 
Emperor, mythical ancestor of Han) is widespread. By equating the Han majority to the authentic 
Chinese, ethnicity is politicized and used as a tool of the state.126 The special status of minority 
groups combined with their economic disadvantages further separates them from the national 
consciousness of the majority Han population.  
While the minority policies of India and China emphasize secularism, they also attempt 
to safeguard minority identities through legal safeguards. In India, the preservation of the 
autonomous regions populated by minority groups is one approach to ensure minority privileges. 
As the only Indian state with a Muslim majority population, Kashmir has a lengthy history of 
dynamic interactions with Hindu majority populations on the Indian subcontinent. Kashmir’s 
geographic isolation and fertile topography ensure that the region is, unfortunately, habitually a 
divisive touchpoint for surrounding powers. Although Kashmir was a traditional regional center 
of Hindu culture, beginning in the 1300s it endured five centuries of Muslim rule which 
dramatically affected today’s population demographics. Kashmir’s annexation by the Indian 
states of Punjab and Jammu in 1819 and 1846, respectively, brought increased oversight and 
attention from the Indian political powers. After Kashmir supported Great Britain in the Indian 
Rebellion of 1857, the region came under the official jurisdiction of the British Raj. Following 
the partition of 1947, Kashmir was officially incorporated into the Indian nation-state via a 
United Nations ceasefire in 1949. While the Line of Control between India and Pakistan through 
the Kashmir Valley is a continual contention, Kashmir remains an autonomous state of India 
with constitutional rights befitting its unique status.  
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Since its inclusion in 1949, Kashmir’s unique autonomous status has been safeguarded. 
Accommodating a distinct Kashmiri identity was the Indian Constitutional Assembly’s guiding 
principle in 1950 when it approved the unique and asymmetric constitutional relationship of 
Kashmir through Article 370 of the Constitution.127  Article 370 acknowledges Kashmir’s 
political freedom, but it also emphasized secularism and, consequently, Muslim singularity 
within the Indian government. While governed by overarching federal laws, Kashmir 
experiences relative autonomy in its political life. Additionally, native residents of Kashmir are 
afforded employment and education benefits and are the only Indian citizens permitted to own 
land in the Kashmir Valley. Although the federal government initially believed that the Kashmiri 
Muslim population would freely and willingly accede to India when given the opportunity, azadi 
(freedom) movements are widespread. While India recognizes Kashmir's distinct cultural 
identity, it also asserts similarities based on their common secular, socialist, and democratic 
agendas.128 Through Article 370’s preservation of Kashmir’s distinct culture and Muslim 
minority rights, the Indian government espouses secularism by specifically addressing the 
religions it supports.  
Despite this emphasis preserving the autonomy of Kashmir and the distinct rights of the 
Muslim minority population, problems arise from the broadness of Indian legislation and its 
implications. Interestingly, the Indian Constitution neither defines the term “minority” nor 
provides sufficient elements to elaborate upon a test determining whether a particular group 
constitutes a minority.129 The Indian government generally identifies minorities after instances of 
prejudice or injustice have already occurred. Despite the lack of methods to classify and identify 
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minority groups, an undeniable link exists between the state and minority populations through 
laws and social norms. For example, in 1985 in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum the 
Supreme Court ruled that Shah Bano had the right to financial support from her husband, who 
had divorced her after forty-three years when he took a second wife. While the Indian Criminal 
Code Section 125 requires husbands to pay maintenance to their wives, Shah Bano’s husband 
claimed that because he divorced Shah Bano under Muslim Personal Law, he was not required to 
provide any financial assistance. By deciding in favor of Shah Bano, the Supreme Court 
effectively ruled that the Indian Criminal Code superseded any civil codes or regulations from 
religious groups.130 Following widespread protests from the Muslim population, India’s 
Parliament passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill, which prevented 
Muslim women from claiming alimony via Section 125. While the ruling impassioned other 
religious groups to seek governance by their respective personal laws, it also indicated a 
troubling and ambiguous legal relationship between the Indian government and minority groups.  
Unfortunately, the ambiguity and inconsistency of the implementation of India’s religious 
freedom laws are troubling for minority relations. Instead of providing a firm separation between 
religion and government, the Indian Constitution and numerous legal precedents create a 
‘relational neutrality’ whereby the principle of private-public distinction and separation of 
religion from the political is neither accepted or rejected.131 Attempts to codify secularism fall 
short through vague statutes and contradictory rulings that were intended to solidify the 
connection between organized religion and government. By deferring to individual states, the 
Indian federal government leaves the systems vulnerable to corruption, prejudice, and overall 
state inaction. In Kashmir, specifically, India’s mismanagement of ethnonational demands 
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facilitated competition and corruption between central political elites and subnational ethnic 
elites.132 The perceived exceptionalism of Muslim minorities to Indian law, especially in the 
cases of Kashmir and Shah Bano, fueled pre-existing discontent behind the guise of civic 
equality. Unfortunately, India’s central failure is that it has democratic institutions but failed in 
democratic action.133 Instead of fostering a united secular society, the inconsistent 
implementation of well-intentioned, albeit vague, statutes supported divisiveness between the 
Hindu majority and Muslim minority groups.  
 Like India’s legal protections of Muslim minority groups breed discontent and separation 
from the greater Indian population, China’s minority policies grant a special, albeit divisive, 
status to Uighurs. The Uighurs are the largest Muslim ethnic minority in China. Nearly two 
thirds of China’s Muslims live in Northwestern China in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region, roughly eight million.134 Xinjiang, which translates to “New Territories” in Chinese, 
officially became a Chinese province in 1884. Prior to 1884, the Uighur people had experienced 
centuries of political and cultural freedom. Descended from the dozens of nomadic tribes in the 
Central Asian steppes, the Uighurs first entered the dynastic Chinese government’s purview 
during the 600s as trade along the Silk Road increased. When the local nomadic populations 
began converting to Islam in the 800s, the region was dominated by independent Sufi Islamic 
city-states. After nearly a century of violent attempts to pacify Muslim warlords of the West, the 
Qing dynasty finally overthrew the region’s last Muslim Khanate in 1759. The Qing’s hands-off 
approach to the region empowered Muslim elites to dominate the region’s political life. An 
independent government was even established by Yakub Beg in the capital city of Kashgar from 
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1820-1877. When the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911, Xinjiang remained under the loose 
jurisdiction of the Republic of China via the authority of provincial warlords. In 1933 and from 
1944-1949, two iterations of the independent state of Eastern Turkestan were established, thus 
supporting centuries of public endorsement for regional independence. Following the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949, CCP forces took control of Xinjiang in 1949 and inaugurated 
nearly a century of struggle to diminish the restrict the region’s historic autonomy. Xinjiang’s 
historic position as a strategic, yet relatively independent, frontier zone of countless Chinese 
governments conflicts with the CCPs contemporary attempts to limit the region’s autonomy.  
The Uighurs official recognition by the CCP as a minority nationality in 1955 ultimately 
provided little support for Xinjiang’s integration into the larger Chinese state. This nationality 
designation not only masked tremendous regional and linguistic diversity, but it also arbitrarily 
included separate regional ethnic groups into the wider Uighur classification.135 The CCPs 
attempts to safeguard minority populations—agricultural subsidies, lower school entrance exams 
standards, protected seats in local governing bodies--provided little redress for persistent 
economic and political inequalities. Perennially undeveloped, the ethnic groups of the Western 
territories suffered through the loss of economic support during the Great Leap Forward and the 
demonization of their cultural heritage during the Cultural Revolution. As a result of growing 
economic disparities between the Han Chinese and minority groups as well as their relative 
isolation in underdeveloped Western territories, religious affiliation and regional heritage rather 
than citizenship to the Chinese state became driving factors in many Uighur’s identities.136 The 
independence of former Soviet Union satellite states in Central Asia in 1991 reinvigorated 
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largely latent Uighur independence movements calling for the establishment of Eastern 
Turkestan. Simultaneously, contemporary Uyghur separatists look back to the brief periods of 
independent self-rule under Yakub Beg and the Eastern Turkestan Republics, in addition to the 
earlier glories of the Uyghur autonomous city-states, as evidence of their rightful claims to the 
region.137 While Xinjiang’s geographic isolation allowed a semblance of peace and cultural 
preservation in the 1970s-1980s, the region’s exclusion from the era’s economic modernization 
steadily fomented resentment. Despite the Uighur’s minority protections under Chinese law, 
their economic, political, and social separation from the Han majority steadily increased 
throughout the twentieth century,   
While geographical isolation bred relative peace for the Uighur’s until the 1990s, the 
central government’s attempts to remedy ethnic inequality paradoxically threatened the Uighur’s 
singular political status and bred societal discontent. To address the ever-growing economic 
disparities between majority groups in Eastern cities and minority groups in Western provinces, 
the PRC leadership announced the Great Western Development plan, or xibu da kaifa, in 1999. 
As the gateway to the energy resources of Central Asia, Xinjiang was central to China’s long-
term development goals. By 2006, the government spent nearly one trillion yuan ($125 billion) 
building infrastructure in Xinjiang, contributing to an annual average regional economic growth 
rate of 10.6 percent.138 Additionally, by 2008, the central government supplied nearly 53% of 
Xinjiang’s budget.139 The 1994 tax reform set the precedence for this unprecedented involvement 
of the central government. Provincial bargaining power decreased in return for autonomy in local 
taxation which was ultimately contingent upon revenue from the central government; Western 
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provinces lacked the bargaining power necessary to dictate how much funding they received and 
where it could be used. Indifferent to the true scope of reforms necessary to remedy ethnic 
inequality, the Western Development Plan was a distributive initiative of the central government 
for only the central government’s issues.140 Politically, the Western Development Plan provided 
a platform not only to monitor ethnic separatists, but also to sway regional sentiment toward the 
CCP through economic incentivization and embedding pro-Party personnel in prominent 
positions in government and industry. The Western Development Plan benefitted the central 
government rather than the Uighur’s of Xinjiang. 
While economically successful, the Western Development Plan facilitated the further 
degradation of relations between the CCP and the Muslim Uighur minority group. Rather than 
correcting regional imbalances, the Western Development Plan took on strategies and projects 
that increasingly strengthened only select border regions and their peoples.141 Additionally, the 
migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang to take advantage of economic development only 
reinforced the Muslim minority status. Between 1953 and 2006, the Han Chinese population of 
Xinjiang increased from 6.1 percent to 40.6 percent.142 The Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps (XPCC)—administrative coordinator of all development projects in the 
region—reserved 800 of 840 civil servant jobs for Han Chinese.143 Unfortunately, many native 
Uighur’s were unqualified to fill the high-level jobs the development projects brought to the 
region and the CCP failed to fund training or education programs. As industry in Xinjiang grew, 
Uighur’s were even pushed out of their traditional agricultural realms. For example, in June 
2004, a new reservoir and hydropower station along the Tekas River caused widespread protests 
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when authorities forcibly removed 18,000 farmers, workers, and herders but only compensated 
880 (about $100) of the 38,800 yuan ($4600) promised to them.144 Ultimately, the unequal and 
corrupt execution of the Western Development Plan both further subjugated Uighurs to their 
minority status and facilitated widespread discontent.  
Political Crises of Muslim Minorities in Kashmir and Xingjiang 
The inconsistent implementation of Muslim minority protections in India led to an 
increase in nationalist sentiments, specifically from the prominent political group Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP). Steadily increasing their power since the 1980s, the BJP maintains that the 
allocation of privileges by India’s legal system is grossly misused by minorities. Because the 
government’s preferential treatment induces separateness, Muslim minorities are creating a 
nation within the Indian State.145 The notion of a divided Indian state opposes its inherent 
identity as a Hindu nation, they posit. The BJP draws heavily upon the Hindutva ideology, or the 
belief that Hindus are united around a common culture which forms a basis for the Indian 
nation.146 Begun in 1925 to spread Hindu culture, Hindutva quickly transformed from a cultural 
outreach program to a foundational ideology of the Hindu nationalist movement. By tying 
culture to race, the BJP makes it possible to define a “pure” nation, albeit only within the 
confines of Hinduism.147 The BJP effectively capitalizes upon fears of Muslim insurgencies in a 
post 9/11 world, historic ambitions to regain control of Kashmir, and discontent over the 
widening wealth disparities between majority and minority groups to gain support. Kashmir, 
specifically, serves as a convenient microcosm of the BJP’s fears of the loss of Hindu majority 
culture to the Muslim minority. Ultimately, by defining entrance into the Hindu nation with a 
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territorially contained notion of culture, the BJP can denote some minorities within the ambit of 
Hinduism, but the rest as foreigners.148 
The strongest supporter of the BJP’s rhetoric is Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Prior to 
assuming the role of Prime Minister, Modi was the Chief Minister of Guajarat, an 
underdeveloped Western state, from 2000-2014. In March 2002, Muslim extremists set fire to a 
train with Hindu nationalists onboard who were returning from a pilgrimage, killing 58. 
Coincidentally, the pilgrims were returning from Ayodhya where riots in 1992 took thousands of 
lives over the disputed Babri Masjid mosque which was allegedly built upon a sacred Hindu site. 
Following the train massacre, Modi declared the incident the work of Muslim militants and 
displayed the victims’ bodies in Ahmedabad, the capital city. Nearly two thousand citizens, most 
of them Muslim, perished in the riots that followed.149 Despite the carnage, Modi’s involvement 
in the riots was both applauded by BJP hardliners and forgotten by the general public. In 2002, 
Modi’s positive public profile drew investments to Gujarat who saw their growth rate jump to 
12% in 2006, nearly double the national average.150 Despite the previous carnage in Gujarat and 
the inability of Modi’s administration to prosecute any offenders, Modi’s economic successes in 
Gujarat propelled him to the national stage.  
Elected as Prime Minister in 2014, Modi advocated for BJP’s Hindutva agenda on a 
national scale. For example, he strengthened requirements for the building of new mosques and 
madrassas in 2014, tasked the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) 
with revising textbooks “to highlight Indian achievements and glorify Hindu tradition,” and 
supported policy initiatives to reclaim mosques which were built over Hindu temples during 
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Mughal rule.151 In addition to promoting revisionist history, the BJP under Modi also eradicated 
the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. In August of 2019, the BJP controlled legislative body 
approved a suspension of Articles 370 and 35A of the constitution. Redesignated as union 
territories, non-Kashmiri’s may now purchase land and both states are subject to federal 
jurisdiction. While the BJP touts these changes as essential to decreasing the economic 
disparities between autonomous states and the rest of India, they will also lead to demographic 
changes in the predominantly Muslim region. Now that non-Kashmiris may purchase land in the 
Kashmir Valley, the BJP is one step closer to uniting the region with the rest of India. Under 
Modi, the BJP has been singularly dedicated to systematically eradicating the protections 
afforded to Muslims both in Kashmir and throughout India.  
Much like the BJP’s nationalism under Modi highlights the importance of India’s Hindu 
identity, the CCP’s current brand of nationalism emphasizes the prestige of the Han majority. An 
essential modality for the CCP to assert the distinction of the Han majority is through the 
promotion of traditional Chinese values, specifically, Confucianism. Since Xi Jinping’s tenure at 
the Party’s leadership, the CCP has gradually positioned Confucianism to the forefront of the 
national consciousness. Like Prime Minister Modi appeals to the majority population’s cultural 
and religious ties to Hinduism, Xi Jinping similarly attempts to assert national unity through 
espousing the importance of preserving the majority population’s cultural narrative. The state’s 
interest in Confucianism is simple: Confucianism offers an instant made-in-China value system 
with a long track record of holding the country together152 A core facet of Chinese dynastic life 
for over a thousand years, Confucianism emphasized the importance of familial obligations, 
hierarchical structures, and reverence to the rule of law, its subsequent ruler and the government 
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it supported. The Nationalist government’s focus on nation-building and modernization 
combined with the Chairman Mao era-antagonism toward traditional culture as a threat to the 
perennial revolution meant that twentieth century China largely neglected Confucianism. Xi 
Jinping, however, proclaims Confucianism’s lasting vitality and significant contributions to 
human civilization as a whole.153 The CCPs current brand of Confucianism is a stripped-down, 
simplified version that emphasizes hierarchy and obligation to those above.154 In addition to 
including Confucianism in school curriculums, government propaganda campaigns, and media 
representations, the CCP supports a global organization of language schools known as Confucius 
Institutes. Through the resurgence of Confucianism, the CCP effectively masks the 
empowerment of the Han Chinese majority population with support for CCP-fabricated 
traditional Chinese culture.  
While the CCPs recent affinity for Confucianism correlates to their desire to empower 
Han Chinese notions of cultural history, the Party also employs traditional Confucianism's 
prioritization of social harmony and cohesion in their recent quest for national unity. In his 
address to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, Xi touts the 
importance of a patriotic united front: “we must uphold the banner of patriotism and socialism, 
strive to achieve great unity and solidarity, balance commonality and diversity.”155 The great 
unity and solidarity Xi envisions is contingent upon societal harmony. China must staunchly 
oppose all attempts to split the nation or undermine its ethnic unity and social harmony and 
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stability.156  Because Xi’s ambitious vision for China’s future is contingent upon the notion of a 
united Chinese state, any threats to unity are viewed as threats to the security and stability of the 
nation. From the state’s perspective, a heightened religious consciousness among its citizens, 
especially Muslim Uighurs, can lead to dissent if improperly managed.157 If instability occurs in 
Xinjiang, it could quickly inspire separatism and instability in other contentious regions such as 
Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan. To subvert possible insurrection, the CCP effectively 
includes Muslim minority groups like the Uighurs into Xi’s vision of a united Chinese society 
only if they acquiesce to the majority’s will, via adherence to CCP directives.  
Unfortunately, thus far Muslim minority groups such as the Uighurs appear to be 
forgotten in the scope. Not only did the Western Development Plan disproportionately benefit 
Han Chinese migrants, but it also bred significant resentment among the Uighur population. The 
consequences of heightened ethnoreligious consciousnesses in an unequal society brought two 
realities: a struggle between the dominant state and oppressed minority group as well as conflict 
due to intense competition for resources and opportunities.158 These conflicts first converged in 
1990 at the Baren Township riots. After the closure of mosques that was allegedly built without 
proper governmental permission, Uighurs protested throughout Southern Xinjiang and nearly 
three thousand individuals were killed.159 In the Summer of 2009, a dispute between Uighur and 
Han workers at a toy factory resulted in the deaths of seven hundred Uighurs and incited a 
protest in Urumqi resulting in thousands of injuries for both Uighur and Han citizens.160 Deadly 
incidents between Uighur’s and Han Chinese in Xinjiang continued to escalate throughout the 
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2000s, thus supporting the fears of the central government that instability in Xinjiang could be 
contagious.  
To halt the spread of violence in Xinjiang, the CCP increased its presence in the region. 
Not only did they continue to incentivize Han migration to Xinjiang from Eastern cities, but the 
CCP also increased PLA coverage and appointed a new, stricter, district party chief. Instead of 
easing tensions, these changes angered the already subjugated Uighur population and in 2014, 
violence escalated. In March 2014 at the Kunming Railway Station, eight Uighur men and 
women attacked train passengers with knives, killing thirty-one and injuring another 140. Two 
months later another knife attack and bombing occurred at the Urumqi Railway station killing 
three and injuring seventy-nine.161 Following these attacks, the CCP began detaining Uighurs at 
unprecedented levels under the mandates of the “Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent 
Terrorism.” To limit further separatist momentum in Xinjiang, the CCP employed the principle 
of preventive policing to encourage officials to be suspicious, hyper-vigilant, and proactive 
against any suspicious activity.162 Under the guise of a vocational education and training 
program, Xinjiang’s Governor Shorhat Zakir announced a quasi-legal framework for internments 
to “get rid of the environment and soil that breeds terrorism and religious extremism.”163 
According to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, around 
one million Uighurs and others have disappeared into these camps with no clarity about when 
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they might be released.164 The mistreatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang is indicative of a 
broader national fixation on unity and harmony as a catalyst for societal advancement.  
Conclusion  
The parallel experiences of Muslims in India and China represent broader nationalist 
themes in both nations. Both India and China have crafted distinct nationalist agendas both as a 
response to their contemporary issues and to build a foundation for their future goals. As a result 
of the modern phenomena of traumatic global conflicts, political reorganizations, rapid 
industrialization, and cultural transformations, both India and China developed unique, modern, 
and government-manufactured interpretations of nationalism. India views its successes as a 
modern, secular and democratic state as both an inspiration to its neighbors and a check on 
authoritarianism while also promoting the formation of a cooperative, peaceful and law governed 
region.165 Yet, the Indian government’s historical mistreatment of Muslim minorities, current 
disregard for safeguarding minority protections, and evolving affiliation with the Hindutva 
ideology undermine any attempts at domestic cohesion. The BJPs political agenda attempts to 
codify that national stability and power are contingent upon the Hindu majority's empowerment. 
Effectively, the BJP fabricates an inconsistent and inaccurate political narrative where national 
unity must be achieved, even at the detriment of India’s minority populations. Like India, China 
also places development, harmony, and cohesion above democratic values and strives to use its 
internal stability as a catalyst for regional influence.166 The CCP perpetuates a nationalist 
narrative influenced by selective interpretations of Confucianism where the Han majority alone 
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can secure China’s domestic stability and national unity. Through their restrictive and coercive 
policies in Xinjiang, the CCP indirectly labels the Uighurs as impediments to internal peace and 
political prosperity. The gradual curtailment of the political rights of Muslim minorities and the 
empowerment of each nation’s respective majority populations supports a modern nationalist 
narrative that is both invented by India and China’s political powers and contradictory to their 
foundational narratives. If these nationalist agendas founded upon assumptions of cultural 
supremacy persist and both nations continue to amass regional influence, their global influence 
on minority rights policies is likely. The social implications of a future global hegemony by India 
or China warrant an in-depth review of each nation’s minority rights policies, especially 
considering their present treatment of Muslim minority groups in Kashmir and Xinjiang. 
In India and China, a nationalistic fervor—grounded upon a desire for regional or 
ultimately global influence—has overtaken each nation’s core political principles. Each nation’s 
similar historical origins in the twentieth century, inconsistent attempts to codify minority rights, 
pre-eminent national figures and their respective political parties both construct problematic 
agendas regarding their Muslim minority populations. The present experience of Muslim 
minority groups in Kashmir and Xinjiang are precarious examples of unchecked modern and 
state-centric constructivist nationalism. India’s BJP champions the Hindu majority through an 
aggressive agenda of curbing Muslim Kashmiri rights. In China, the CCP employs revisionist 
history and re-education to eliminate the Uighur’s distinct cultural identity. As India and China 
continue to gain prominence in both Asia and the global community, their efforts to unify their 
populations as a pretext for internal stability will invariably increase. In the future, India and 
China’s efforts to limit Muslim minority rights for nationalistic ambitions could be transposed to 
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other facets of society. Thus, an understanding of each nation’s nationalist identities is 





















Destabilizing the China Dream: Nationalism and 
Domestic Corruption in China 
 
Although corruption may be a ubiquitous, integral, even expected part of most political 
systems,167 as Andrew Wedeman writes, it is particularly prevalent in China. China’s 
transformation into a formidable world power has ironically coincided with perpetuating a 
historic, albeit dangerous, corruption cycle. The idea of guanxi, or the reciprocity of personal 
relationships, is the foundation of many economic, political, and social aspects of Chinese life. 
While guanxi fortifies a cultural acceptance of corrupt practices, China’s rapid transformation to 
a market economy further solidifies the prevalence of corruption as an avoidable characteristic of 
life in contemporary China. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the CCP exerts significant 
resources on anticorruption campaigns and reforms to alter this societal propensity towards 
corruption. Despite these reforms, Xi Jinping’s distinct brand nationalism facilitates increases in 
domestic corruption.  Specifically, Xi Jinping’s monopoly of the CCP ensures they promote his 
narrative of modern and state-centric constructivist nationalism, which empowers the majority 
Han Chinese population to achieve lofty economic, and subsequently political, goals. The 
achievement of these goals will both remedy China's historic misfortunes and secure its future 
position as a global hegemony. In the CCPs estimation, as a future global hegemony, China must 
fortify the authority of the central government at all costs.  
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While China’s rise in ranks of the international community appears unrestrained by 
current corruption levels and the CCP’s nationalist agenda, the long-term effects of this cultural 
corruption are undetermined. China’s cultural acceptance of corruption combined with the 
consequences of its rapid transition to a market economy, the inconsistent application of 
anticorruption reforms and the pervasive influence of the CCP under Xi Jinping’s singular 
ideology supports a national culture where corruption is both expected and rewarded. In 
analyzing the relationship between corruption and Xi Jinping’s nationalist agenda, this paper will 
highlight a variety of factors in four sections. First, I will provide an overview on corruption 
studies and China’s rankings within the international community. Second, I will examine the 
impact of China’s historic relationship with corruption. Third, I will discuss the implications of 
Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaigns. Fourth, I will analyze Xi Jinping’s modern and state-
centric constructivist nationalist agenda through an investigation of his public remarks and high 
visibility government programs. Ultimately, examining the connection between Chinese 
corruption levels and the CCP’s nationalist agenda under the helm of Xi Jinping’s leadership 
affords an essential understanding of China’s cultural past, its present difficulties, and its future 
global aspirations.  
Corruption Studies and Metrics 
 Corruption analysis is a field of study plagued by inherent difficulties. Most nations are 
generally unwilling to expose the breadth of their systematic or institutionalized corruption 
purely for academic study. Perceptions of corruption can adversely affect a nation's reputation 
not only domestically but also within the international community. In most countries, there is a 
latency period in reporting from when the corrupt offense took place and when it was reported to 
authorities. Specifically, China experienced an increase in its average latency period during the 
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economic transition in the 1980s.168 The “hiddenness gap”—when corrupt events are exposed to 
the general public—and the “sensitivity gap”—when information is available to the academic 
community—challenging environment for both corruption scholars and political reformers 
alike.169 In some nations, corruption can be more rampant than officially recorded due to societal 
acceptance (or resignation) of corruption’s influence. Similarly, if the public does not see 
corruption as a direct threat to improving its socio-economic well-being,170 corruption can be 
perceived as a necessary, albeit unfortunate, component of modern life.  Inadequate legislation or 
government processes to prosecute offenders or the fear of political or economic retribution for 
reporting corruption both beget difficulties in studying corruption. Undoubtedly, corruption in 
most nations exists well beyond the scope captured in published analysis.  
Despite the inherent challenges of corruption studies, there are well-respected 
international and regional organizations that focus on this field of study. The leading global 
organization for tracking and analyzing corruption metrics, Transparency International (TI), 
habitually quantifies China's seemingly unbridled corruption. TI employs two ranking 
mechanisms: the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Global Corruption Barometer 
(GCB). The annual CPI ranks countries based on their perceived level of corruption in the public 
sector by experts and business executives. The roughly bi-annual GCB—touted by TI as the 
most extensive public opinion survey on corruption—analyzes a local population's assessment of 
corruption. In the most recent CPI in 2019, China’s score of 41 out of 100 (100 is very clean, 0 is 
highly corrupt) and ranking of 80 out of 180 nations reviewed171 is a testament to its 
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institutionalized corruption. Since TI’s inception, China’s CPI score consistently fails to reach 
the top half of the 31 nations in the Asia Pacific, and its CPI ranking has never surpassed the 
2018 level of 87.172 Similarly, the most recent GCB in 2017 identified China as the most corrupt 
country in the Asia-Pacific region. An astonishing 73 percent of respondents believed that 
corruption had increased in China within the last two years.173  
While TI analyzes nations globally, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
(PERC) organization examines corruption in business and politics throughout Asia. The PERC 
ranks countries on a scale of 0 to 10 (1 is very clean, 10 is highly corrupt). Since the 1990s, 
China consistently ranks in the latter half of corrupt nations in Asia. For example, throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s, China’s score vacillated between a 7.3 in 1995 (tied with India for the 
most corrupt nation in Asia) to a 9.0 in 2003.174 From 2009-2018, China’s score reached a high 
of only 6.55 in 2017 before averaging at 7.08.175 While some scholars argue that PERC data 
could be exaggerated due to a lack of comparison, China’s consistent dismal representation is a 
testament to its relatively corrupt international persona. Additionally, because the PERC 
provides insights into certain biases that might distinguish how executives in one country differ 
from those in another country,176 it is a useful metric to assess high-level corruption. Corruption 
at the highest echelons of business and politics in China is a frequent source for political 
commentary, public dismay, and academic research. Ultimately, the widespread perceptions of 
corruption in China both from the regional and international communities indicate corruption's 
significance in Chinese life.  
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Historic Sources of Corruption in Chinese Society  
A notable characteristic of Chinese corruption is the idea of guanxi, or the reciprocity of 
personal relationships. Guanxi is paramount to China’s distinctive Confucian bureaucratic 
culture centered on the rule of man rather than the rule of law.177 Politicians, entrepreneurs, or 
any citizens of influence cultivate guanxi networks to fulfill professional and personal needs. 
Financial investments, political appointments, construction permits, and even school admissions 
are invariably influenced by one’s guanxi network or lack thereof. Not only do successful guanxi 
networks enrich the lives of its members, but they also serve as a practical tool for self-
preservation. The importance of maintaining mianzi, or face, among network members often 
results in diverting punishment (unjustly) onto individuals outside the network. The resilience of 
guanxi networks stems from their ability to exist within the infrastructure of Chinese society. 
Although guanxi networks began as informal institutions, they subsequently substituted and 
complemented formal rules to eventually subvert new formal institutions.178 By thriving within 
the Chinese society’s foundations, guanxi is an accepted, albeit unfortunate, fundamental 
characteristic of life in China.  
Guanxi networks, and the corruption they support, maintain their influence in China due 
in part to the complicit support of Chinese society. These networks prove themselves to be 
resilient and timeless characteristics of Chinese culture.179 In imperial China, the 
misappropriation of public funds was an acceptable practice because it was assumed that public 
officials had the right and public authority to do so.180 As China’s economy fluctuated, many 
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citizens viewed corruption as a necessary income supplement within the guanxi gift economy.181 
Because of its importance throughout history, some citizens are resigned to accept guanxi 
networks and the corruption they support.  In response to the suicide and subsequent corruption 
case of Beijing Vice Mayor Wang Baosen and his associate Chen Xitong in 1995 Andrew 
Wedeman writes, “the public appeared to accept Wang Baosen’s suicide and Chen Xitong’s 
sacking with a combination of apathy and irony. Most Beijing residents assumed Wang and 
Cheng were corrupt because they believed most senior cadres and their families have dirty 
hands.182 Undoubtedly, the difficulties of enforcing reforms within the entrenched bureaucracy 
of the CCP or redefining cultural norms also supports the continued influence of guanxi 
networks. However, the profound ambivalence that the Chinese have about guanxi is perhaps a 
more powerful force in supporting its prevalence.183 
In addition to guanxi networks, corruption in contemporary China also stems from the 
consequences of its rapid transition to a market economy. Although economic scarcities rooted in 
China’s central planning did create incentives for bureaucratic abuse in the era of Mao 
Zedong,184 reported corruption levels remained relatively constant until the reform era. 
Following the Cultural Revolution, the government loosened economic regulations to support 
growth at the local level. Because public officials gained increased control over scarce resources 
(land, capital, business), they also had abundant opportunities for corruption via rent-seeking.185 
Local governments also could collect taxes and raise expenditures at their discretion through 
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fiscal sharing. Provincial governments accounted for a remarkable 71.7% of government 
expenditures and revenue from 1990-1995,186 a clear indication of government abuse. As local 
authorities extracted increasing rents, high-ranking party officials similarly took advantage of 
growing markets. The explosion of corruption during the 1980s and 1990s was a policy outcome 
of economic reforms.187 The government limited their oversight of state-owned enterprises while 
simultaneously minimally regulating private businesses, a relative novelty in the decades past's 
highly disciplined Chinese economy. Thus, increased economic freedoms with limited oversight 
guaranteed increased corruption.  
While the economy of China developed quickly, methods to classify and regulate 
corruption advanced slowly. Both legislation and administrative bodies to investigate or 
prosecute corruption cases did not develop until the 1970s. In 1979 the Chinese Criminal Law 
defined only three types of corruption—embezzlement, bribery, neglect of duty—without 
stipulating punishments until a 1997 revision. Gradually, both corruption laws and official 
reports of corruption increased. For example, in 1998, 249 laws and regulations were used to 
control bribery in China, and in 2007, there were 542.188 Official reports of corruption cases also 
rose from 89,000 in 1979 to over 243,000 in 1990.189 Currently, state officials' non-criminal 
corruption cases are reviewed by the Ministry of Supervision while the CCP's Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) vets cases concerning party members. The 
People’s Procuratorate investigates criminal corruption cases of all citizens. Inside China, the 
low number of reports and the gradual development of effective legislation indicates that 
corruption is perceived as an unavoidable, albeit unfortunate, aspect of society. 
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While the legislative and administrative specificities of China’s anticorruption 
infrastructure is still evolving, this infrastructure relies upon a single ideology: the superiority of 
the CCP.  The institutional design of the PRC gives primacy to the Communist Party, which 
invariably influences the organizational procedures and regulations of the anticorruption 
efforts.190 For example, the CCDI must gain approval from the Politburo Standing Committee 
prior to investigating high-level cases. When the case involves a Politburo member, a unanimous 
consensus from current and previous committee members is required. Undoubtedly, these 
members are protected by both Party allegiances and extensive guanxi networks. The head of the 
CCDI’s local body—the Committees for Disciplinary Inspection (CDI)—is also part of the 
provincial Party networks and similarly plagued by allegiance to the CCP and their respective 
guanxi networks.191 Interestingly, the CCDI investigates significantly more cases than the 
Procuratorate, which only prosecutes criminal conduct. For example, in 2014 the CCDI 
investigated 232,000 cases while the Procuratorate filed 41,500.192 Many cases are held at the 
CCDI level indefinitely, pending party investigations, and may never reach the Procuratorate. 
While efforts to shield its members from public scrutiny may be common in many large 
organizations, any specific attempts to conceal, contain, or ignore corruption within the CCP's 
ranks bolsters guanxi networks' power and solidifies corruption’s intrinsic value in Chinese 
society.  
Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption Reforms 
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 During his first speech to the Politburo upon assuming the role of General Secretary of 
the CCP in November 2012, Xi Jinping warned: “if corruption becomes increasingly serious, it 
will inevitably doom the party and the state.”193 By beginning his tenure with an ambitious 
initiative to re-define the relationship between Chinese society and corruption, Xi Jinping's 
anticorruption reforms reflect the boldness of his leadership style and his administration's policy 
goals. Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaigns are the largest and longest campaigns in the history 
of the CCP. Previous anticorruption campaigns—held every two years since the reform period in 
1982—were largely ineffective. These yanda (strike hard) anticorruption strategies can help new 
leaders to establish their authority throughout the country, but such campaigns have not, in the 
long run, curbed corruption, advanced transparency or heightened legitimacy within the Chinese 
state.194 With only 677,924 cases brought against corrupt cadres throughout the late twentieth 
century, these campaigns led to a routinization of anticorruption efforts.195 In contrast, Xi 
Jinping’s anticorruption campaigns target high ranking cadre and provincial officials and 
catalyze institutional change. To ensure his campaigns avoid the routinization of previous efforts, 
Xi Jinping’s administration also targets “naked officials” (luogoan, whose spouses and children 
have emigrated overseas with funds borne of corruption), state-owned enterprise officials, and 
senior military members.196 Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaigns are high-minded assaults on 
both the elite CCP members and the average citizens who support China’s corruption cycle.  
 In addition to broadening the sections of Chinese society it affects, Xi Jinping’s 
anticorruption reforms also alter the existing anticorruption infrastructure. Various reforms 
include creating inspection teams to monitor provincial-level officials, granting additional legal 
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powers to the provincial inspection teams, and instituting a series of regulations that 
automatically trigger disciplinary action.197 Additionally, the CCDI exhibits increased control in 
appointing local CDI leaders, all while under the centralized CCP anticorruption structure. Many 
scholars maintain that the goal of Xi Jinping’s reforms—while helpful in tackling systematic 
corruption—is not an independent legal structure, but rather a more centralized system that is 
useful for supervising local authorities and increasingly independent from local interests.198 By 
appointing local officials who are merely further extensions of the Party apparatus, Xi Jinping 
can consolidate support for both the CCP and its anticorruption initiatives.  While the expanding 
powers of the CCDI assist in centralizing CCP authority, the National Supervision Commission 
(NSC) is another extension of the Party power structure. Created in 2017 with the Supervision 
Law, the NSC monitors all public servants, not just CCP members. With broader investigatory 
authorities than the CCDI and few legal constraints, the NSC reports directly to the CCP as the 
fourth branch of government. Ultimately, Xi Jinping's anticorruption reforms support the 
primacy of the CCP in monitoring, investigating, and prosecuting corruption cases.  
As well as fortifying the primacy of the CCP, Xi Jinping’s anticorruption reforms also 
revitalize the traditional mass campaign tactics of the Maoist era. During the early years of the 
PRC, since corruption was perceived as individual wrongdoing rather than as an institutional or 
systemic problem, people were mobilized in periodic rectification campaigns to report 
wrongdoing and criticize decadent thoughts and behavior.199 While there have been numerous 
rectification campaigns of varying intensity throughout China’s modern history, the rectification 
campaign of 2013 was the most well publicized. To tackle the evils of the Four Winds 
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(formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and waste), Xi Jinping’s instituted an anticorruption 
rectification campaign under the tenants of the traditional Maoist model of self-purification, self-
improvement, self-innovation, and self-awareness.200 The connection of Maoist rhetoric to 
contemporary government initiatives—combined with the appointment of CCP loyalists in 
provincial CCDI positions—solidified widespread popularity and support for the rectification 
campaign. With the variety of reforms and reliance on traditional Maoist practices, Xi Jinping is 
both circumventing existing institutions and cautiously setting up a base, albeit a flimsy one, for 
new institutions to follow.201 This amalgamation of the traditional practices and contemporary 
policies secures essential support for Xi Jinping's rectification campaign and his strategic 
objectives for the CCP.  
 While Xi Jinping's anticorruption campaigns consolidate popular support behind 
traditional Maoist rhetoric, they also admonish prominent Party figures. Although corruption is 
evident throughout Chinese society, in recent years, it is most visible within the highest ranks of 
the CCP. For example, in the last 30 years, 4.2 million high ranking officials were punished for 
corruption, with 660,000 from 2007-2012.202 Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the CCP strives to 
discipline and expose corrupt leaders. Xu Caihou, the highest-ranking general of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee Member, were 
both convicted of corruption-related crimes from 2014-2015. Another notable corruption scandal 
involved Bo Xilai, the former Communist Party Chief of Chongqing. Once vetted for a position 
on the illustrious nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, Bo Xilai was publicly popular 
due to his Chongqing Model, specifically designed to combat corruption. Despite this promising 
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career, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for taking RMB 20 million ($3.3 million) in bribes 
and embezzling RMB 5M ($817,000) from his time as mayor of Dalian from 1993-2000.203 
Simultaneously, Bo Xilai’s wife Guo Xilai was sentenced to life in prison for assisting in the 
murder of a former business partner, Neil Haywood. Among the ranks of the CCP, corruption 
has become a source of periodic instability within the elite as the war on corruption claims an 
increasing number of politically sensitive victims.204 Xu Caihou, Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, and 
other disgraced public figures are touted as symbols of China’s corrupt past who would have no 
place in the CCP's glorious future.  
While the fallen leaders of Xi Jinping's tenure may be truly corrupt, they could also be 
mere casualties of the public's evolving opinion—and the CCP's evolving standards—on 
corruption.  However, these fallen leaders were likely the fatalities of Xi Jinping's swift 
consolidation of power within the ranks of the CCP. Influential leaders whose popularity, 
ideology, or ambition threaten Xi Jinping's predominance within the CCP are usually victims of 
the rectification campaigns misaligned Maoist morality. For example, Bo Xilai’s ambitious 
campaigning for a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee was a direct threat to the smooth 
succession of Xi Jinping as the newly selected General Party Secretary in 2012.  Xu Caihou and 
Zhou Yongkang were revered government figures whose lengthy tenures and considerable 
wealth were antithetical to Xi Jinping’s message of societal revitalization and global 
advancement without reliance on historical corruption. Thus, the rectification campaigns both 
affirm the traditional values of the CCP while also suggesting that Xi Jinping will continue to 
employ anticorruption initiatives to deal with resistance within the party.205 Under Xi Jinping, 
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the CCP’s anticorruption campaign will inevitably remain an extralegal, party-led movement 
with Xi exerting absolute authority to silence any criticism.206 The prosecution of high profile 
Party members supports both the efficacy of the anticorruption rectification campaigns and Xi 
Jinping’s consolidation of power.  
Unfortunately, the exposure of corruption at the highest levels of the CCP has a 
negligible effect on China’s current corruption levels. The Chinese Armed Forces, previously 
seemingly immune to CCP political infighting, is the government's newest sector under increased 
corruption suspicion. As of November 2017, 82 generals and senior colonels had been detained 
or under investigation for corruption-related offenses.207 In addition to infiltrating the Chinese 
military, corruption’s large scale in China has also affected financial security. As of June 2013, 
16,000-18,000 officials have fled China, taking approximately RMB 800 billion ($130 
billion).208 To combat this continued financial strain and public disapproval, the CCP 
aggressively investigates and prosecutes corruption-related offenses. For example, in the first 
half of 2016, the CDIC conducted approximately 500,000 investigations.209 Additionally, by 
mid-2017, 15,000 CCP members had received punishment for violations of anticorruption 
disciplines.210 Despite the gravity of China’s corruption and the CCP’s substantial increase in 
corruption-related investigations and prosecutions, China remains one of the most corrupt 
nations in Asia and the world. Since Xi Jinping’s tenure began in 2012, China’s CPI scores have 
remained between 36 in 2016 and 41 in 2019.211 While the current anticorruption campaigns 
have increased corruption reporting, the politicization of such efforts is undeniable. 
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Xi Jinping’s Nationalist Ideology 
In addition to serving as a valuable tool to consolidate power within the Party, Xi 
Jinping's anticorruption reforms also fortify the contemporary political narrative of the CCP. 
Specifically, the CCPs emphasis on the central government's authority—largely possible because 
of Xi Jingping's anticorruption initiatives—ensures that the Party continues to promote Xi 
Jinping's singular modernist and state-centric constructivist nationalism. To analyze the 
implications of this nationalism on corruption, an understanding of modernist and state-centric 
constructivist nationalism is imperative. To modernists, nationalism exists due to the shifting 
balances of power, industrialization, mass migrations, traumas of regional and global conflicts, 
and ideological shifts characteristic of only modernity. Although ethnic identity may still play a 
role in nationalism, nationalism is simply the result of the modern changes these ethnic identities 
experience. Modern nationalism reflects the basic social organization of the industrial world and 
industrializing people.212 While state-centric constructivism also considers the influences of 
modernity on nationalism, it places greater emphasis on the modern nation-state’s ability to 
influence the development of nationalist thought. Specifically, nationalism is a byproduct of the 
state's policies that create an artificial identity to support its broader political goals. The CCP 
under Xi Jinping blends modernist and state-centric constructivist nationalist ideologies to affirm 
the central government's authority and simultaneously remedy contemporary issues while 
supporting future aspirations. 
Throughout Xi Jinping's public remarks, there is evidence of modern nationalism’s 
influence on the political agenda of the CCP.  Xi Jinping's political ethos and vision for China's 
future—also known as the China Dream—emphasizes the Chinese people's singularity and 
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establishes a narrative upon collective future ambitions. Stressing a theme of national 
humiliation, Xi Jinping has set a populist agenda that strikes large, even grandiose, hopes.213 
Upon assuming his role as General Secretary of the CCP in November 2012, Xi Jinping stated 
that “in the modern era, our nation experienced constant hardships and difficulties.”214 After 
highlighting Chinese traumas in modernity, Xi Jinping inaugurated his ideology of societal 
rejuvenation; China must work “for realizing the great revival of the Chinese nation in order to 
let the Chinese nation stand more firmly and powerfully among all nations around the world and 
make a greater contribution to mankind.”215 By addressing them in his first major address to the 
CCP, Xi Jinping establishes success over historical traumas and national rejuvenation as titular 
themes of his administration. In his address to the 19th National Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping re-
emphasizes these themes while also touting the importance of a patriotic united front: “we must 
uphold the banner of patriotism and socialism, strive to achieve great unity and solidarity, 
balance commonality and diversity.”216 Throughout his catalog of public remarks, Xi Jinping 
repeatedly emphasizes that the China Dream's fulfillment is contingent upon a stable and united 
society. While only possible with the central government's careful oversight, the China Dream's 
stable and united society will eventually remedy past traumas and prepare China for its 
illustrious future. Thus, from Xi Jinping’s narrative, the China Dream is founded upon a distinct 
modern nationalist identity.  
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In many of Xi Jinping's public remarks, he characterizes corruption as the major 
impediment to achieving the China Dream of national rejuvenation. As the destabilizing force in 
both the CCP and Chinese society, corruption is the focal point of Xi Jinping's nationalist 
agenda. While addressing the 19th CCDI in January 2019, Xi Jinping called for developing a 
“sweeping victory” against corruption.217 Illustrating the severity of the task at hand, Xi Jinping 
stated that "no place has been out of bounds, no ground left unturned and no tolerance shown in 
the fight against corruption."218 In addition to targeting political opponents, Xi Jinping also 
instituted limits on Party officials' spending and donations. This clampdown on “tigers” (senior 
officials) and “flies” (rank and file officials) by the CCP is a concentrated attempt to indicate that 
rising corruption does not signal a break-down in Party control.219 Additionally, these restrictions 
ensure that the “Party supervises its own conduct and enforces strict discipline,” so the CCP 
“will always be the firm leadership core for advancing the cause of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.”220 By connecting Party unity and stability with the clampdowns on corruption, 
Xi Jinping ensures that both efforts' success are associated with realizing the China Dream.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
In addition to tightening discipline within Party ranks, the government's overwhelming 
focus on combating corruption led to the codification of Xi Jingping’s superiority within the 
CCP. Specifically, Xi Jingping's rousing 2019 address to the CCDI led to the passage of a CCDI 
communique. In this communique, the CCDI concluded that the safeguarding of Xi Jinping's 
status at the core of the CCP Central Committee and Party was a top initiative for 2019. 221 
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Simultaneously, this communique emphasized the superiority of the Party Central Committee in 
managing discipline throughout the CCP. Thus, the very government infrastructure Xi Jinping 
revolutionized and empowered with his anticorruption initiatives (CCDI) effectively fortified his 
domination of Chinese politics. Solidifying the General Secretary's position as the crux of the 
CCP, the CCDI communique ensures that corruption reforms will remain a cornerstone of Xi 
Jinping's and, thus, the CCP's political agenda. 
Employing his domination of the CCP's political structure, Xi Jinping promulgates a 
nationalist political agenda emphasizing the close relationship between economic growth and the 
China Dream. Because China’s rise as a great power is contingent on its sustained economic 
prosperity, only a stable domestic order and a peaceful external environment will guarantee 
undisturbed growth.222 Xi Jinping promulgates the Chinese nation's historical goals, prevalent in 
politics since the market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s: economic development and anti-
imperialism in order to reach a high international status.223 Thus, the CCP's political narrative 
emphasizes economic progress as a cornerstone of the China Dream. For example, at the 19th 
National Congress of the CCP in 2017, Xi Jinping identifies “securing a decisive victory in 
building a moderately prosperous society in all respects” as a central theme.224 Xi Jinping 
highlights that “it is imperative that [China] develop a modernized economy” as both an “urgent 
requirement for getting us smoothly through this critical transition and a strategic goal for 
China’s development.”225 Additionally, while outlining China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-
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2025) in October 2020, Xi Jinping commented that “China will continue to focus on economic 
development to ensure that peace and development remain the theme of the times.”226 
Throughout his policy agenda, Xi Jinping habitually unites economic growth with the stable 
future of the China Dream.  
To achieve the domestic stability, national rejuvenation, and financial superiority of the 
aspirational China Dream, Xi Jinping establishes ambitious economic goals. For example, in 
September 2020, Xi Jinping pledged the achievement of a carbon-neutral China by 2060. 
Although China is the global leader in greenhouse gas emissions, Xi Jinping stated that "China 
will scale up its environmental [efforts] by adopting more vigorous policies and measures."227 
The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative is similarly aggressive. Pledging to invest more than 
US$50 billion, Xi Jinping commented that “the Belt and Road will be built into a road of 
prosperity; development is the master key to solving all problems.”228 While China's heavy use 
of coal-fired plants to develop the OBOR initiative regions could adversely affect their 
aspirations for carbon-neutrality, both objectives ultimately support the China Dream's goal of 
national rejuvenation through economic superiority.  Effectively, the China Dream has 
reinforced the importance of China’s money-first atmosphere where bureaucrats and officials 
have new opportunities (and fewer disincentives) to put their influence up for hire.229 Aspirations 
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for carbon neutrality and the OBOR initiative are excellent examples of grandiose economic 
goals—and additional sources of corruption—of the CCP under the helm of Xi Jinping.  
Despite the zeal of the Xi Jinping era's economic initiatives, they may prove unattainable 
due to China's lack of adequate government infrastructure to monitor and deter corruption as 
well as institutional shortcomings. As the CCP places more demands on companies to support 
this aggressive growth, corruption could invariably increase.230 Faced with unrealistic demands 
for production outputs or the development of innovative technology, some companies may revert 
to reliance on comfortable guanxi networks to ease unsustainable operations. Additionally, Xi 
Jinping's anticorruption reforms have created a political infrastructure that reimagines guanxi 
networks in a modern form that is obedient to the primacy of the CCP and its nationalist agenda. 
While ambitious, Xi Jinping’s revamped anticorruption infrastructure—CCDI, NSC, code of 
conduct for CCP officials—may support the dangerous culture of corruption it hopes to control. 
With corruption figures consistent since the institution of stricter spending regulations on Party 
members in 2015, it is unlikely that Xi Jinping’s anticorruption infrastructure can effectively 
combat corruption. China’s continually dismal record in Transparency International’s reports 
indicates endemic corruption and the shortcomings of Xi Jinping’s reforms.  
While Xi Jinping’s anticorruption initiatives may prove ineffective, they establish the 
larger goal of further promoting the CCPs nationalist ideology. Specifically, the CCPs 
anticorruption reforms bolster the Party’s efforts to centralize Chinese political authority with the 
CCP. Xi Jinping’s anticorruption initiatives are an alternative modality of promoting a 
manufactured Chinese nationalism founded upon a culture where corruption—now synonymous 
with disloyalty to Xi Jinping's authority—is criminal. The anticorruption infrastructure and its 
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reforms empower the CCP and disenfranchise its perceived opponents. The high-profile 
corruption cases investigated by the CCDI primarily prosecute Xi Jinping’s rivals, such as Bo 
Xilai, Sun Zhengcai and Zhong Yongkang. Additionally, Yang Xiaodu, a noted ally of Xi 
Jinping, oversees the NSC. With its luizi, or detention, powers, the NSC can hold suspects in 
custody for six months without counsel or a hearing.231 While the CCDIs fortified powers and 
the newly appointed local CDIs should increase oversight of potential sources of corruption, their 
investigation and prosecution of non-CCP members ensure they remain an efficient tool for 
identifying dissenting opinions from the Party line. Ultimately, the expansive powers of the Party 
in corruption infrastructure and the CCPs selective disciplining of political opponents ensures 
that Xi Jinping's administration crafts a nationalist ideology where the following mindsets are 
ruthlessly enforced: the authority of the central government reigns supreme and political dissent 
breeds instability. Confronted with endemic corruption from the CCP, the China Dream's lofty 
economic goals and the Party’s nationalist ambitions may prove unattainable without sufficient 
political reforms.  
Conclusion 
Despite their successes in consolidating Xi Jinping's power, the anticorruption reforms' 
efficacy is still unproven. While ambitious, these anticorruption rectification campaigns must 
reconcile countless ideological difficulties to be optimally effective. For example, Xi Jinping's 
anticorruption policies must simultaneously overcome traditional notions of entrenched 
corruption and support the CCP's current narrative of modernity and national rejuvenation. 
Additionally, these policies must highlight the injustices and abuses within the CCP while still 
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garnering support for the government from the Chinese population. This confidence in 
government is essential to promoting the political and economic objectives of the CCP in support 
of their nationalist agenda. While the CCP's corruption reforms are wide-ranging, some of Xi 
Jinping's statistical successes could result from changing public perceptions of corruption instead 
of the efficiency of the reforms themselves. Arguably, the high-profile cases of Chen Xitong and 
Wang Baosen likely facilitated a shift in society's tolerance for corruption in the CCP. Social, 
political, and economic changes in the twenty-first century affect Xi Jinping's anticorruption 
campaigns' efficacy.  
Xi Jinping’s anticorruption initiatives ultimately facilitate the perpetuation of guanxi 
networks, support the authority of the CCP and its nationalist agenda, and encourage the 
continuation of widespread corruption. Remarkably, Xi Jinping both employs the cultural 
practices he vehemently opposes (guanxi networks) while simultaneously enforcing bureaucratic 
reorganization. While Xi Jinping's modern and state-centric constructivist nationalist ideology 
champions increased stability and decreased corruption at a surface level, its biased execution of 
corruption reforms and underlying emphasis on economic progress ensures corruption will 
invariably increase. Even if the CCP continues its advocacy of manufactured nationalism—
where the authority of the CCP and loyalty to Xi Jinping’s agenda reigns supreme—without 
careful reform, Xi Jinping's China Dream may become synonymous with corruption. A thorough 
understanding of the implications of Xi Jinping's distinct nationalist agenda on Chinese 
corruption levels can fortify the international community's understanding of the inner workings 
of a burgeoning world power. China's historical propensity to corruption combined with the 
execution of Xi Jinping's imbalanced anticorruption initiatives has created a nation whose 





Building an Ecological Civilization: Nationalism 
and Environmental Civil Society in China 
  
Inaugurated at the CCPs 17th National Congress, the ethos of an ecological civilization232 
quickly became a central focus of the CCP. While the CCP historically addresses environmental 
concerns as merely a small facet of its grandiose political agenda, the 17th (2007) and 18th 
(2012) National Congresses codified environmental conservation as an essential component of 
China's long-term global ambitions. The passage of stricter environmental legislation and various 
bureaucratic reforms, and a publicly popular—albeit seemingly unattainable—emissions targets 
support this theoretical ecological civilization. An increasing number of widespread 
environmental protests, effective domestic and foreign Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), and media publicity targeting a generation of environmentally conscious Chinese 
creates a formidable environmental civil society supportive of the idealistic tenants of the CCPs 
ecological civilization. While the rising number of environmentally conscious organizations and 
ecologically conscious government policies are indicators of an increasingly influential 
environmental civil society, they also support China's rise within the international hierarchy by 
mirroring other first-world nations' environmental standards. While robust, China's 
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environmental civil society is a small component of China's broader goals to redefine its global 
image as a leader in ecological reforms. Ultimately, China's growing environmental 
consciousness is the result of a civil society immeasurably influenced by the nationalist policies 
of the CCP under Xi Jinping. 
In conjunction with China's meteoric rise in the global economic and political hierarchy, 
China is gradually positioning itself at the forefront of environmental compliance within the 
international community. Internationally, China lends its support to selective climate change 
accords and publicizes sustainable practices in the nations affected by the Belt and Road 
Initiative. Domestically, Xi Jinping champions the creation of an ecological civilization through 
bureaucratic reforms, propaganda campaigns, and lofty national ambitions. While China may be 
the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide, Xi Jinping announced in September 2020 that 
China would reach carbon neutrality by 2060. The stark dichotomy of China's negative 
environmental footprint and its positive future environmental aspirations raises questions on 
Chinese environmentalism's origins and efficacy. China's recent turn to environmentalism 
originates from a two-fold agenda: to secure domestic stability and the appearance of political 
liberalism through support to environmental CSOs and to foster a positive image by leading the 
international community in environmental affairs.  
While robust, China's environmental civil society is a small component of China's 
broader goals to redefine its global image as a leader in ecological reforms. Ultimately, China's 
growing environmental consciousness is the result of a civil society immeasurably influenced by 
the control mechanisms of the CCP and its distinct nationalist narrative under Xi Jinping. To 
analyze the nature of China’s environmental civil society and broader nationalistic goals, this 
paper will highlight a variety of factors in four sections. First, I will provide an overview of 
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environmental civil society and discuss the history of environmentalism in China. Second, I will 
examine the relationship between environmental civil society and the CCP. Third, I will 
highlight major incidents of environmental activism by environmental civil society groups. 
Fourth, I will analyze the relationship between Xi Jinping’s environmental agenda and 
nationalism. Ultimately, an understanding of environmental civil society's relationship to Xi 
Jinping’s political agenda will provide a greater understanding of China’s singular approach to 
nationalism.  
Civil Society and Environmentalism in China 
Marxist-Leninst ideology and traditional Maosim are undeniable influences on 
contemporary China’s views on civil society. Because the Soviet Union was the pre-eminent 
Communist power when the modern nation-state of China was founded in 1949, the CCP relied 
heavily on Soviet political structures and operations as a model for early Maoism. According to 
the Soviet bureaucratic system, environmental problems were seen as temporary phenomena that 
could be solved through scientific and technological measures.233  An impediment to national 
unity, civil society was primarily abandoned or ignored under the Soviet system. Similarly, the 
early iterations of the CCP eliminated anything that stood between the state and the individual; 
only state entities parading as non-state entities were permitted to continue operating.234 
Employing hierarchical mass line communication, Mao Zedong sought to limit the ideological 
chasm between the Chinese people and the CCP. If the Party could communicate nearly directly 
with the Chinese people, then civil society organizations (CSOs) were unnecessary. Until the 
death of Mao Zedong in 1976, environmental CSOs and environmental activism were nearly 
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non-existent. Influenced by China's Soviet and Maoist origins, the CCP viewed environmental 
activism as an impediment to economic development and a sound relationship between the CCP 
and the Chinese people.  
 As restrictions on China’s economy and political life eased after Mao Zedong's death, a 
gradual increase in environmental awareness supported the slow growth of environmental CSOs. 
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping began a series of reforms that revitalized China's political, economic, 
and social life. These gradual modernizations, however, did not reverse the CCPs traditional 
unsympathetic view toward unregulated civil society. The modern CCP maintains that civil 
society is state-led, and cooperates with, rather than opposes the state; political space is thus 
conferred and, by extension, guided by the state.235 While most early NGOs or CSOs focused on 
broad philanthropy topics (poverty reduction, children's healthcare) under government oversight, 
environmental CSOs slowly organized. Notably, the growing presence of international NGOs in 
China supported the gradual growth of environmental activism. Unfortunately, the Tiananmen 
Square massacre of 1989 led to the silencing of any civilian activism regarding political 
topics.  While many students and protestors abandoned activism following the deadly 
confrontation, many channeled their energies to less controversial issues—environmental 
organizations with non-threatening platforms. In Beijing, the number of formally registered 
environmental social organizations rose from one to four between 1967 and 1992 and doubled 
from nine to eighteen from 1995 to 1996.236 By 2008, 2,768 environmental CSOs were operating 
in China.237 Because environmental CSOs successfully adapted to changing political and social 
trends, they gradually gained prominence in Chinese society.   
 
235 Schwartz, 45. 
236 Ho, 901. 
237 Bao Maohong, “Environmental NGOs in Transforming China.” Nature and Culture 4, no. 1 (2009): 2, accessed 
on January 8, 2021, www.jstor.org/stable/43304125. 
91 
 
Despite the CCPs relative toleration of non-confrontational CSOs, the Party’s views on 
civilian activism tightened in the 2000s as the perceived liabilities of an opening society in the 
digital age increased. In 2013, the CCP issued the Communique on the Current State of the 
Ideological Sphere identifying seven subversive currents coursing through Chinese society.238 
Anecdotally referred to as Document Number Nine, this directive emphasized the importance of 
Party unity by attacking dangerous ideologies that could adversely affect China’s growth and 
stability. The directive specifically identified Western constitutional democracy, civil society, 
and neo-liberalism as part of a complicated, intense struggle to undermine China’s ideological 
sphere.239 Shortly after its publication, observers noted an increase in the arrests of noted 
activists, lawyers, and academics from a wide range of CSOs.240 Document Number Nine 
indicates the CCPs grave insecurity that any substantial opening of society--primarily via CSOs--
could facilitate further social unrest and political change.  
The CCP further codified its strict relationship with social organizations through the 
Charity Law and the Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations 
(Foreign NGO Law) in 2016. Both laws implemented significant controls over civil society 
operations in China. The Charity Law increased the barriers for official designation as a CSO or 
NGO—registration fees, government backing, minimum membership—and subsequently 
inhibited numerous organizations from operating legally or at all. The Foreign NGO Law made a 
clear distinction between domestic and foreign resources, raising barriers for Chinese 
organizations (particularly unregistered grassroots groups) seeking foreign funding and 
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collaboration.241 The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) regulates foreign NGOs and stipulates 
that they must be sponsored by a government agency and cannot inhibit national security. While 
both laws included positive benefits for CSOs—tax benefits, policy advice from authorities, 
codifying a once confusing and regulated—they ultimately increased CCP oversight and 
decreased CSOs autonomy. After Document Number Nine codified civil society as a threat to 
national stability, the 2016 NGO laws further exemplify the CCPs attempts to increase their 
jurisdiction over CSOs, both foreign and domestic.  
Although the CCP has exerted significant effort to stifle civic involvement, the CCP 
largely fails to quell the growing societal awareness of environmental issues. This societal 
awareness drives an increasing number of citizens to advocate for environmental causes or 
participate in civilian activism organizations. From 2001 to 2005, governmental organizations of 
environmental protection received 2,530,000 letters from the masses, as well as 430,000 visits, 
totaling 597,000 people affected by pollution, accepted 673 proposals from members of the 
National People's Congress, and 521 proposals from members of the National Political 
Consultant Conference (the political advisory body of the CCP).242 Natural disasters and rampant 
pollution forced many citizens to reconsider China’s environmental record and the government’s 
role in environmental protection. For example, the government’s slow response to an earthquake 
in Sichuan in 2008 which killed 70,000, prompted many citizens to participate in CSOs. In 2011, 
the U.S. Embassy in Beijing's published air pollution data revealed Beijing's worsening air 
quality. Not only did these reports contradict those disseminated by the Beijing municipal 
government, but they also led to vocal societal discontent, which forced the CCP to censor any 
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discussions on air quality from the Internet and social media.243 The perception by many 
members of the Chinese public that the CCP ignores environmental affairs—much to society's 
detriment—pushes some citizens to support environmental activism despite the CCPs restraints.  
Despite mounting public support for environmental issues, the CCP has failed to create 
an effective governmental system to regulate, monitor, and enforce environmental statutes. Of 
the twenty-eight environmental protection laws passed in China since 1979, thirteen were passed 
between 2000 and 2008.244 From 2007-2013, the CCP established 130 environmental courts to 
hear civil, criminal, and administrative environmental cases.245 These environmental courts are a 
powerful tool to set a legal precedent for environmental issues and appease the Chinese public’s 
growing zeal for environmental concerns. The low number of cases investigated—on average 
less than 100 a year246—and the selective organizations involved—largely GONGOs or 
government special interest groups--indicate the environmental court systems’ potential futility. 
Touted by the CCP as a significant step forward for China's environmental compliance, the 
Environmental Protection Law is another example of selective environmentalism. In 2015, the 
revised law authorized CSOs to sue polluters to protect the public interest. The low number of 
past cases (eight before 2012, two in 2014, three in 2015) are attributed to state supported 
GONGOs or CSOs, while recent case data is absent.247 The central government can effectively 
dictate which environmental issues are deemed worthy of investigation, effectively ignoring 
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concerns that portray the CCP in an unflattering manner. In the end, environmental protection is 
just one goal of the environmental court system, to be balanced carefully with the need to 
safeguard social stability and the continued, vital importance of economic growth.248 China’s 
environmental legal framework indicates the CCPs imbalanced dedication to environmental 
reforms.  
Like environmental legislation, environmental regulatory bodies in China suffer from 
biased oversight and improper implementation. National environmental standards are regulated 
by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), elevated to a ministerial organ in 2008. 
Previously known as the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China (MEP), the MEE 
oversees twelve internal departments and the subnational Environmental Protection Bureaus 
(EPBs). While the CCPs policies typically highlight the central government's primacy, 
environmental regulations ironically empower local authorities. Local governments are the front 
lines of identifying environmental concerns, punishing offenders, and enforcing regulations. 
Unfortunately, environmental protection often loses to the more attractive goal of economic 
development.249 EPBs receive funding from provincial governments and are primarily beholden 
to local interests. With little support from the MEE and its previous iterations—SEPA had only 
one-eighth of the employees of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as of 2015—local 
governments habitually prioritize economic growth. The patchwork environmental authorities of 
ministerial 250mandates, local action plans, and central crackdowns reflects the often conflicting 
lines of authority that fragment the Chinese state and environmental governance; environmental 
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compliance is ad hoc and short-lived.251 Ultimately, two key shortcomings--insufficient authority 
and lack of coordination among institutions—highlight China's environmental regulatory bodies' 
institutional deficiencies.252 Because many environmental regulatory bodies improperly execute 
their duties, environmentalism remains unsupported by the Chinese government. 
Environmental Civil Society and the CCP 
To survive amidst the CCPs draconian approach toward civil society, environmental 
CSOs must constantly adapt to remain relevant to the community and nonthreatening to the 
Party-state apparatus. Due to their recent development, many environmental CSOs are weak in 
terms of organization, and human and financial resources while also primarily focusing on 
regional issues.253 However, their focus on local or regional matters ensures these CSOs 
undertake little risk that their niche focus area will foster a national movement. Increasing 
awareness of the perils of environmental degradation by the CCP and the Chinese public help 
provide environmental CSOs with a growing comprehensive support base. Instead of appealing 
to only academic or social elites like political movements of the past, modern environmental 
CSOs attract concerned citizens from various social classes. The rising middle class, specifically, 
has called for a more transparent and accountable system of governance throughout a variety of 
sectors in Chinese society, environmentalism included.254 Their local nature and goal of 
protecting the environment, rather than political rights or commercial organizations, enables the 
movements to organize a large number of citizens with little effort in a very short time.255 While 
the diverse membership of environmental CSOs could prove dangerous to the CCP in the future, 
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the current CSOs adherence to regional, passive topics is deliberate. To maintain relevance 
amongst the CCPs uncompromising political agenda, environmental CSOs have largely secured 
a nonthreatening position in society supported by diverse membership. 
China's most influential environmental—the Friends of Nature—remains successful due 
to its advocacy for regional issues, socially diverse membership, and overall apolitical nature. 
Although the Friends of Nature is not an official GONGO, its registration with the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs ensures it boasts numerous Party supporters contributing to its lengthy and 
nonconfrontational history. Established in 1993, its charismatic leader, Liang Congjie, adeptly 
steered the organization along the delicate CCP political lines until 2010. The organization 
boasts over 100,000 members with numerous branch offices.256 Under Congjie’s leadership, the 
Friends of Nature successfully advocated for publicly popular issues like protecting the Tibetan 
antelope and the snub-nosed monkey. Although their campaigns gain moderate national 
attention, each issue's specificity and the entire organization's measured apolitical tactics ensure 
the Friends of Nature remains non-threatening to the CCP. The Friends of Nature limits its 
membership and rejects branch office or affiliation requests, concerned that if it attracts too 
many members or even establishes a close relationship with any regional group, it might be 
viewed as contravening government restrictions on NGO activities.257 Additionally, as a member 
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Standing Committee with numerous 
political contacts, Liang Congjie was an invaluable asset to the group’s political credibility. Yet, 
Liang Congjie’s greatest contribution to environmentalism in China may well be in his service as 
an activist above reproach; with his distinguished reform lineage, as well as his 
nonconfrontational approach to change, he was able to work within the system to push the 
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boundaries of what the government considers acceptable activities for NGOs.258 By continually 
blending environmentalism with Party allegiance, the Friends of Nature continues to prove itself 
the most influential environmental CSO in China. 
Despite the Friends of Nature’s success in navigating CCP politics, environmental CSOs 
are still subject to significant control mechanisms and central government restrictions. The 
autonomy of green social organizations is a space of continuous negotiation and wavering 
between official control and informal toleration.259 The CCPs primary control method is through 
the recent Charity and Foreign NGO Laws' registration and operation restrictions. By raising the 
fees, minimum membership, and overall requirements for CSO registration, the CCP effectively 
bars countless non-state supported organizations from entry into the official discourse. In 2019, 
the Minister of Civil Affairs estimated that there were approximately 800,000 social 
organizations in China.260 Yet, the Ministry also estimates that only 23.3 percent of 
environmental CSOs register properly and the remainder are illegal.261 Without official 
government recognition, CSOs and their members are subject to legal ramifications, further 
deterring entry into unsanctioned NGOs. In addition to limiting registration requirements, the 
central government delineates formal regulations to shut down NGOs. According to the Public 
Security Bureau, local officials can neutralize a troublesome NGO through the following means: 
the sponsoring organization can cease its support, the NGO can be closed down for financial 
reasons, and key leaders of the NGO can be transferred to other jobs that leave them little to no 
 
258 Elizabeth Economy. "The New Politics of the Environment,” In The River Runs Black: The Environmental 
Challenge to China's Future, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, (2010), 157, accessed January 16, 2021, 
doi:10.7591/j.ctt7z8gj.9. 
259 Ho, 915.  
260 Luo Win, ”More than 800,000 social organizations in China” People’s Daily, January 7, 2019, accessed on 
February 20, 2021, http://www.cssn.cn/shtt/201901/t20190107_4806979.shtml 
261 Maohong, 7. 
98 
 
time for outside work with the NGO.262 The codification of barriers to establishment and 
justifications for closure of environmental CSOs provides ample opportunity for the CCP to 
control their agenda and operations.  
In addition to regulating the operations of CSOs and NGOs, the CCP also controls the 
operations of GONGOs. Grassroots organizations are dependent on the recognition of the state 
and therefore seek to strengthen their contacts with government officials.263 Conversely, 
GONGOs are state sanctioned organizations secure in the political and financial support of the 
CCP. While all legal CSOs in China must be registered with and supported by a government 
agency, GONGOs paradoxically enjoy greater freedoms and restrictions due to their close 
affiliations with the CCP. GONGOs access to government officials ensures they can influence 
policy discussions and freely criticize local officials. However, the MEE controls the finances of 
GONGOs (salaries, manning) and GONGOs overall have limited autonomy; they are constrained 
in their ability to take positions critical of broader government protection initiatives.264 Staffed 
with former government officials and Party members, GONGOs are transparent mouthpieces of 
the CCPs environmental priorities that generally value economic interests over environmental 
protection. A state-directed effort to train government bureaucrats in establishing NGOs is a 
testament to the depths of CCPs involvement in GONGOs.265 By solely protecting CCP 
environmental interests and monopolizing environmental discourse, GONGOs hinder the 
development of grassroots organizations that could better reflect the Chinese population's 
environmental priorities.  
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The CCPs efforts to monitor, prohibit, and control the public discourse on 
environmentalism through GONGO and CSO restrictions indicate an underlying fear: an 
unregulated environmental civil society could serve as a catalyst for greater social and political 
reforms. The intense oversight of NGOs and GONGOs is merely a small indication of the CCPs 
intense paranoia of losing political control, thus facilitating a degradation of social stability. The 
CCP fears that environmental NGOs (ENGOs) could potentially become a force against the 
government, which would not be helpful to the construction of a harmonious society; a 
harmonious society is a static balance society, not a dynamic one.266 Because of the CCPs 
emphasis on social and political stability, environmental CSOs attempts to advocate for 
noncontroversial topics may, unfortunately, be futile. Environmental action without explicit 
political aims may still be political; it is politics by other means.267 Incidents of successful 
environmental activism—whether by GONGOs or NGOs—could serve as a precursor to 
reconstructing state-societal relations. Despite the inherent biases of continual alignment with 
CCP directives, the current operations of the environmental court system, GONGOs, and the 
environmental bureaucracy reflect the Chinese public's overwhelming desire for environmental 
reforms. The intense oversight from the CCP ensures that environmental change will only occur 
incrementally. Yet, the CCP will continue to supervise environmental operations until the threat 
of social and political reform subsides. 
Despite the CCPs continual efforts to regulate environmental civil society in China, 
environmental CSOs are thriving, albeit within strict confines of CCP oversight. Because of its 
gradual and state-controlled development, environmentalism currently has an opportunity to win 
influence in environmental policymaking; to build up strong expertise on specialized issues; and 
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gain experience with participatory actions that give citizenry a voice.268 The environmental 
CSOs that thrive under the vigilant oversight of the CCP undoubtedly propel environmental 
change while learning invaluable techniques for survival under an autocratic government. 
Additionally, the rise of China’s ENGOs has a discursive outcome: it launches public debates 
and media campaigns about environmental issues, thus introducing a new environmental 
discourse into the public sphere.269 While environmental groups may not specifically strive for 
more significant political change, their operations support a state-societal dialogue that is novel 
in the single-party state. Environmental civil society also serves as an essential mediator of 
societal tension by channeling popular grievances into legal and peaceful forms of protest and 
seeking redress.270 Ironically, Chinese environmental civil society provides a non-threatening 
outlet for the politically inclined while simultaneously portraying the CCP as a progressive entity 
sympathetic to the public’s concerns. The CCPs apparent sympathies to environmental issues, 
however, does not mean that the central government has the resources, time, or desire to address 
environmental concerns. Thus, environmental CSOs fill roles previously occupied by the 
national or local governments and state-owned enterprises.271 The dichotomy of the CCPs 
attempts to regulate environmental civil society while relegating environmental concerns to 
secondary political priorities is telling of the Party's intense fear of political destabilization. By 
supporting a thriving environmental civil society that is paradoxically terrified of a CCP 
crackdown, the Party retains ultimate control.  
Environmental Protests 
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Despite the CCPs attempts to completely control environmental CSOs, CSOs support an 
increasing number of environmental protests in recent history.  By adhering to the same 
operational tenants as successful environmental CSOs, civilian activism experiences growing 
visibility in Chinese society. For example, most modern environmental protests focus on local or 
regional issues, thereby negating the CCPs fears of a larger national environmental movement. 
Protests since the late 1990s typically seek compensation, or nominal retrospective justice, for a 
controversial act that occurred in the past, thus emphasizing victimhood-driven resistance.272 In 
the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, environmental protests typically involved only 
academics or social elites; broad social movements were viewed as both dangerous and 
ineffective. However, most twenty-first century protests are nonexclusive, preventive, and have 
mutual reinforcement with sustained advocacy.273 Because this activism aligns with CCP 
priorities and highlights regional concerns, it remains favorable in the eyes of the Party’s elites. 
Although recent environmental activism in China results in well-publicized protests, they 
ultimately adhere to the unthreatening, issue-driven, and unifying ethos of environmental CSOs. 
In addition to maintaining politically palatable organizational tactics, environmental 
protests in China adeptly utilize the media. The Internet and social media are undisputedly the 
quickest and most effective means of communicating China’s ever-growing population. Between 
2000 and 2017, the number of Chinese Internet users skyrocketed from 22.5 million to over 720 
million, making it the world’s largest Internet nation.274 Environmental CSOs employ this 
consistent internet usage to disseminate ideas, coordinate protests, and invigorate supporters. 
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Interestingly, in China’s complex political environment where censorship is widespread and 
protest rights are limited, social media makes possible the decentralized and rhizomatic uprisings 
that punctuate and invigorate China’s growing environmental movement.275 While 
environmental CSOs employ the Internet and social media adroitly, the CCP has also sanctioned 
extensive media coverage for environmental protests.  For the media, environmental issues are 
news-worthy, loaded with moral and political meanings and policy implications, yet politically 
safe because they fall in line with the state policy of sustainable development.276 While essential 
in spreading environmental awareness throughout China, media coverage of environmental 
issues and protests also provide essential backup for the CCPs limited bandwidth. Specifically, 
by promoting the growth of environmental NGOs and media coverage of environmental issues, 
the Chinese leadership hopes to fill the gap between its desire to improve the country’s 
environment and its capacity to do so.277 Environmental activists, the CCP, and media outlets 
employ the Internet and social media to serve individual concerns. 
The first major environmental protest of the twenty-first century involved southwestern 
China’s Nu River in the Yunnan province. Flowing from Tibet to the Andaman Sea, the Nu 
River—also referred to as the Salween River—runs through southern China and sections of 
Myanmar and Thailand. In 2005, the CCP introduced plans to build thirteen dams along the river 
to provide 3.64 million kilowatts of power to the region.278 Environmental groups opposed the 
forcible displacement of 50,000 Chinese citizens, adverse effects on the livelihoods of millions 
living downstream in Myanmar and Thailand, and the negative consequences on the Nu River 
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Valley’s delicate ecosystem.279 In response to the dam proposal, 10,000 college students signed a 
petition against construction and held demonstrations at campuses throughout Yunnan 
Province.280 Activists both worked through institutional channels—appealing to the Friends of 
Nature for support—and grassroots channels—an effective Internet campaign. Small farming 
communities along the Nu River also participated in the protests. As a result of the outrage, the 
CCP placed the proposed construction under environmental review in 2006. After nearly two 
decades of civilian activism and environmental protests, the Nu River remains the longest 
undammed river in mainland Southeast Asia. Portions of the river are now protected in China’s 
Three Parallel Rivers UNESCO World Heritage Site. Although plans to construct five of the 
original thirteen dams were included in the 12th Five-year Plan in 2013, the plans were 
abandoned yet again in 2016. Efficient organization, multi-pronged activism, and a united 
population contributed to the Nu River protests' early successes.   
Unfortunately, China’s desire to dam the Nu River is full of paradoxes. While fears from 
the scientific community raised in 2017 that constructing a massive dam could trigger an 
earthquake contributed to the halting of the final stop on proposed construction, civilian activism 
by both provincial farmers and regional academics was a direct contributor to the continued 
delays project. Additionally, before environmental CSOs undertook Nu River activism as their 
prime focus, there was little evidence that any of the dam-affected people perceived injustice or 
made claims based on their rights.281  However, when the CCP failed to achieve its goal of 350 
gigawatts of hydropower by 2020, the Nu River development projects were pushed back into the 
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limelight.282 The CCPs goal of developing Western provinces to reduce rural poverty and 
provide alternative energy sources still leaves the Nu River vulnerable. What is remarkable about 
the Nu River protest movement is that despite the CCPs push toward alternative energy sources 
and hydropower in the last few decades, activists have applied consistent pressure to the Party 
and prevented the construction of the dams on multiple occasions. Interestingly, in 2017 the CCP 
has approved funding for constructing a dam along the Myanmar portion of the Nu River. Thus, 
the CCP facilitated the ecological degradation of Myanmar's Nu River valley while protecting its 
own. Ultimately, consistent activism by both provincial farmers and regional academics are a 
direct contributor to the continued delays of dams on the Nu River.  
Like the Nu River protests, the anti-paraxylene (PX) petrochemical plant protests in 
Xiamen were an excellent example of China’s robust environmental civil society. In June 2007, 
the wealthy city of Xiamen was at a standstill due to widespread civilian outrage against the 
proposed construction of a PX petrochemical plant in the city. Due to improper operations, 
Chinese PX petrochemical plants release dangerous toxins into the air and drinking 
water.  Students and professors at Xiamen University sent out a million mobile-phone text 
messages calling on their citizens to take to the streets.283 Protestors reportedly numbering 
between 7,000 and 20,000 marched peacefully throughout the city, and a video of the activism 
was uploaded to YouTube and Weibo.284 As a result of the well-coordinated protest, Xiamen’s 
government cancelled plans for the PX plant. Ultimately, the Xiamen protests are considered a 
victory for public participation; the central government genuinely listened to environmental 
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concerns, and the Xiamen government worked to protect the city.285 Citizens from diverse facets 
of society—students, business leaders, middle class, urban poor—joined in the protest efforts. 
Because of the unprecedented, expeditious, and well-organized response by the Xiamen 
population, the government’s quick reversal of their plans reached both national and 
international news. The anti-PX protests in Xiamen were a superb example of effective 
environmental activism. 
While the Xiamen anti-PX protests resulted in little backlash, the larger anti-PX protest in 
Maoming in 2014 caused political unease. From March to April 2014, tens of thousands of 
protestors assembled in central Maoming while over 600 million connected on social media to 
view live footage of the ongoing protest.286 Footage of the protests that internet censors quickly 
blocked revealed civilians injured by police forces. After an onslaught of outraged social media 
postings on Weibo and Weixin, the Maoming government stated that the proposed PX plant was 
still under review. As of 2021, the Maoming PX plant is still under review, with little likelihood 
that the plans will progress. Because of their effective use of the media, the Maoming protesters 
generated intense unease from the Maoming government, as evidence by dangerous police 
actions and subsequent abandonment of the construction plans.  
 The Nu River, Xiamen, and Maoming protests each exemplify the ideals that have made 
environmental civil society in China a formidable force, despite the restrictive policies of the 
CCP. For example, each protest addressed regional issues—dams, PX plants—rather than broad 
divisive concerns. While hydropower, chemical contamination, or the government’s disregard 
for environmental issues were the overarching thematic concerns, the environmental NGOs 
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involved in these incidents instead focused on the very human appeal of a specific location and 
issue. Each protest included assorted social classes and adeptly employed the media. Most 
importantly, the Nu River, Xiamen, and Maoming protests delicately toed the line between 
subverting authority and respecting the primacy of the CCP. Environmental activists won small 
victories while the CCP continued to win the war of dominating environmental regulations. 
While construction of the Nu River Dams was halted in Chinese territory, the Chinese 
government is continuing with plans for five dams in other Southeast Asian nations, 90% of its 
electricity would be exported to China and Thailand.287 The PX plant slated for the wealthy city 
of Xiamen was moved to the rural and poorer city of Zhangzhou in the Fujian province. Protests 
that erupted after an explosion in the Zhangzhou plant in 2013 were unsuccessful at halting 
operations. Despite the Maoming protest’s social media successes, the CCP arrested, detained, 
and sentenced 18 activists after the events. Ultimately, the public is successful with determined 
yet moderate action; environmental activists must continue applying maximum pressure in a 
calm fashion to remain successful.288 The protests in the Nu River, Xiamen, and Maoming were 
both successful and unfortunate examples of CCP biased environmentalism. 
Xi Jinping’s Environmental Agenda 
Since Xi Jinping’s tenure as General Secretary began in 2012, the CCPs environmental 
agenda can be summarized in one phrase—ecological civilization. While it originates from the 
Soviet concept of ecological culture, ecological civilization rose to prominence in the CCP 
narrative beginning in 2007. At the 17th National People’s Congress in 2007, Hu Jintao 
referenced ecological civilization as a new focal point for the CCP. When Hu Jintao transferred 
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power to Xi Jinping at the 18th National People’s Congress in 2012, Xi Jinping solidified 
ecological civilization and environmentalism as a priority of the CCP and his tenure as General 
Secretary. Xi Jinping proclaimed that the CCP will raise its ecological awareness to respect, 
accommodate, and protect nature and follow a state policy of conserving resources and 
protecting the environment.289 By 2018, ecological civilization was included in the CCP 
Constitution and the Constitution of the PRC. Ecological civilization is first and foremost as a 
continuation of China’s developmental path under the leadership of the Communist Party-
transforming from agricultural civilization to industrial civilization under Mao Zedong, then to 
material civilization under Deng Xiaoping, and now to ecological civilization under Xi Jinping—
a faithful reincarnation of Marx’s theory of the stages of socialist development with Chinese 
characteristics.290 As General Secretary, Xi Jinping legitimizes the ecological civilization as both 
a continuation of Hu Jintao’s policies and a fulfillment of socialist development.  
The CCPs emphasis on creating an ecological civilization under Xi Jinping's leadership is 
an effective tool to connect China’s past, present, and future political narratives. Because of the 
tremendous political appeal of environmentalism and the concept of an ecological civilization to 
the Chinese people, China’s go-green efforts are inextricably linked to the political and 
ideological ambitions of the state.291 Xi Jinping’s vision for advancing the cause of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics—the China Dream—embodies the CCPs political and ideological 
ambitions.292 Unlike his predecessors, who had conceived of the environmental crisis as a social 
and political threat with insoluble global connections, Xi Jinping made it a positive narrative, a 
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key attribute of the rallying cry of the China Dream.293 As the future global hegemon, China 
must embrace the notion of establishing itself as an ecological civilization, a global leader on 
environmental issues. The assertion that China, a nation that has largely ignored environmental 
protection in the pursuit of economic progress, can radically alter its present concept of 
environmentalism to support a theoretical future of global leadership is no small feat. Xi 
Jinping’s political narrative emphasizes that China must first play the part of a global leader 
before assuming the role. Effectively, national rejuvenation and international hegemony are 
contingent upon China’s assumption of the global image of an ecological civilization. 
Domestically, Xi Jinping’s ecological civilization manifests itself through stark 
contradictions. Specifically, the CCP emphasizes the creation of a modern global society focused 
on environmentalism while simultaneously disenfranchising environmental CSOs and supporting 
unregulated economic growth. Consequently, these practices expand the authority of the Chinese 
state while adversely affecting China’s environmental record. The Charity and NGO Laws' 
restrictions, preferential treatment of GONGOs, and government responses to environmental 
activism guarantee that environmental civil society is perennially bound to the CCPs political 
narrative. Economic development has been and remains the ultimate objective of the Chinese 
government and the underlying motivation for Beijing’s intensification of environmental efforts 
is their assessment of the costs and benefits of taking mitigation actions sooner rather than 
later.294 The CCPs seemingly contradictory choices—production of toxic and unregulated PX 
plants, support of ecologically detrimental dams for alternative energy sources, continued 
position as the top carbon emissions in the world—indicate the economic profitability of China's 
selective environmentalism. Unfortunately, the reality of Xi Jinping’s ecological civilization is 
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that environmental discourses that challenge the positive vision of the future are excluded, as 
well as those implying that a precondition for achieving the ecological transition is a more 
radical change in the country’s political structure.295 an empowered civil society. Thus, a distinct 
interpretation of ecological civilization characterized by the Party’s authority in enforcing 
environmental reforms predominates in Chinese policies. The CCP departs from the prevailing 
policy since the Deng Xiaoping era of “separation of party and state” to assert the supreme 
power of the party in all critical governance institutions, environmentalism included.296 By 
emphasizing the primacy of the party’s ideology in Chinese politics, the CCPs distinct 
interpretation of ecological civilization ironically devalues true environmental efforts in China.  
While the contradictions of China’s domestic implementation of the ecological 
civilization inhibit true environmental and political reform, China’s international environmental 
record is significantly more favorable. For example, in the 2014 U.S.-China Climate Pledge, Xi 
Jinping set targets to peak carbon-dioxide emissions in 2030 and establish clean energy sources 
or 20 percent of China’s total energy production by 2030.297 China supported both the 2015 and 
2017 Paris Climate Accords with even lower carbon dioxide emissions standards, despite the 
United States’ departure from the agreement. Although China declined to lower emissions 
standards even further at the 2019 Brazil climate accords negotiations, their public proclamations 
at achieving carbon neutrality by 2020 received widespread international attention. Effectively, 
China continues to attempt to position itself as a global leader in environmental concerns despite 
their troubling domestic ecological record. While China has demonstrated an increasing 
willingness to obey international environmental accords, it is still viewed as being "laggard" 
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because the domestic concerns of the state have an enormous impact on China's international 
engagement.298 Despite troubling domestic issues, China’s prioritization of international 
environmental standards support their fixation on crafting a global image as a progressive leader 
on environmental concerns.  
Conclusion 
In prioritizing the creation of an appealing global image as a leader in environmentalism, 
the CCP uses fabricated environmentalism to serve the Party's larger nationalist aims. The CCPs 
grandiose claims of constructing an ecological civilization, a lasting testament to the Party's 
strength, foresight, and overall prestige in Chinese history--further fortifies the positive narrative 
of the China Dream. Additionally, China's faux environmentalism aligns with CCPs fabricated 
and selective environmental platform intended to convince the international community that 
China is diligently toiling to evolve and assume its position as the global hegemon. The future 
global hegemon must be aware of and sympathetic to the prevailing concerns of the times. While 
China's selective environmentalism may be minimally effective, it successfully convinces the 
international community of China's dedication to ecological preservation. Unfortunately, Chinese 
environmental CSOs, in short, have been caught up in the larger struggle by Xi Jinping’s 
administration to craft a stronger party and a stronger China.299 The restrictive policies of the 
NGO and Charity Laws and the CCPs circumvention of the demands of environmental protests 
indicate that the Party is far from dedicated to true ecological reform. However, the notion of an 
ecological civilization is optimally effective in both convincing the Chinese public to invest in 
the glorious—and theoretical—future of the China Dream and misrepresenting the true scope of 
China's environmentalism to the international community. Undoubtedly, the CCPs theoretical 
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ecological civilization will be built in time, regardless of China's environmental civil society 




























Xi Jinping's tenure at the helm of the CCP has coincided with remarkable economic, 
social, and political developments in China. Boasting the world's second-largest economy, China 
will likely soon surpass the United States in economic development and output. Additionally, 
China's financial leadership in the Asia-Pacific is seemingly secure with the Belt and Road 
Initiative's steady advance, despite its consistent controversy. The Tiananmen Square-era calls 
for social and political reform are largely silenced as the spoils of prodigious economic growth 
are attributed to the efficacy of strict oversight by the CCP. Social relaxations spurred by 
globalization and the media's proliferation do little to deter mass support for the Party. 
Politically, a concentrated effort to further legitimize the power of the CCP dominates the Xi 
Jinping-era's policies. The abolition of term limits for the Party’s General Secretary, the 
fortification of Xi Jinping’s allies—and the eradication of his rivals—within the political 
bureaucracy, and the mobilization of Chinese citizens behind the dream of Chinese rejuvenation 
fortifies the CCPs position as architects of China’s future. With the CCP's authority cemented as 
the crux of Party-State operations, the CCP can perpetuate its political agenda unencumbered, 
thus immortalizing it as China's political ethos for decades to come. China's economic, social, 
and political evolution during the Xi Jinping era is integral to developing the CCPs political 
vision for China's future. 
113 
 
With this rejuvenated authority, the CCP advocates a political agenda characterized by 
overt nationalism. This nationalism, specifically, promotes a modern and state-centric 
constructivist narrative that predicates China's global ambitions upon support for this ideology. 
China's modern nationalist political narrative focuses on China's degradations and difficulties 
during its recent past and present reality. The humiliations China suffered at the hands of 
countless invading political and economic forces—Mongolians during the Qing dynasty, British 
during the colonial period, Japanese during the first and second world wars—are only secondary 
to China's current difficulties asserting itself within the international hierarchy against 
exploitative Western economic forces.  During his inaugural address to the National People’s 
Congress in November 2012, Xi Jinping stated that “in the modern era, our nation experienced 
constant hardships and difficulties.”300 The influences of modernity—globalization, technology, 
media, population movement—also detract from China's Socialist foundation. While announcing 
an anticorruption campaign in 2012, Xi Jinping’s initiated a Maoist rectification campaign 
targeting the evils of the Four Winds (formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and waste).301 
Formulated in modernity, the Four Winds spurred a spirit of national rejuvenation, which 
underlays the CCPs political narrative. To transform from a vulnerable nation to formidable 
world power, China must renew its loyalty to the Chinese state via the CCPs nationalist ethos. 
Thus, modernity brings both advancement and adversity to Chinese society. This modern 
nationalist ideology is the foundation upon which the modern state-centric constructivist 
nationalism is built. 
In addition to ascribing to tenants of modern nationalism, the CCP also perpetuates a 
state-centric constructivist nationalist ideology. Further legitimized with increased jurisdiction 
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over Chinese political and governmental operations, the CCP crafts a nationalist narrative 
tailored explicitly to its political goals and vision for China's future. This narrative aligns with a 
common phenomenon, as Bill Hayton writes: “all modern states have gone through this process 
of ‘invention’: selectively remembering and forgetting aspects of their pasts in order to present 
an ostensibly and unifying vision for the future.”302 China's vision for its future requires an 
intense national rejuvenation founded upon a version of China's history, culture, and political 
ethos fabricated by Xi Jinping's administration. Only after employing this fabricated nationalism 
can China achieve domestic stability, advance the “cause of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,”303 and assume its rightful place as the global hegemon. To achieve this goal, the 
CCP focuses its nationalist narrative on three items: fostering national unity, empowering the 
CCP, and creating a positive global image. By enforcing unwavering loyalty to these tenants' 
fulfillment, the CCP empowers a political environment where e CCPs steadfast dedication to 
these tenants creates a political climate where allegiance to the Party and support for its political 
agenda is indistinguishable from nationalism. The manufactured nationalism of the CCP 
facilitates the creation of an artificial Chinese past, present, and future to achieve the China 
Dream. 
To impose national unity for national rejuvenation, the CCP adopts restrictive policies 
toward Muslim minority groups. Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, specifically, are the recipient of 
unwelcome attention and unwarranted restrictions from the CCP. Similarly, India's government 
pursues aggressive discriminatory policies toward Muslims in the Kashmir region. Remote 
territories with abundant natural resources and insufficient infrastructure, Xinjiang and Kashmir 
are easily susceptible to abuse by the Chinese and Indian governments, respectively. While 
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India's degradation of Kashmir's legally protected status and China's improper implementation of 
Xinjiang's Western Development Plan in Xinjiang adversely affect each region's Muslim 
minority populations, these policies contribute to a larger nationalist effort to rework India and 
China's histories and reimagine their present into a reality where political empowerment resides 
only with majority populations.  The BJPs prioritization of the Hindu majority and the CCPs 
Han-centric ideology and renewed appreciation for Confucianism contribute to a fabricated 
nationalist ethos intended to enforce national unity. These state-manufactured nationalisms 
promote reverence to the state as superior to religious affiliation. China and India's disregard for 
their secular and multiethnic histories, enforcement of restrictive policies in autonomous regions, 
and overt subjugation of Muslim minority populations are small parts of each nation's more 
significant efforts to foster national unity in support of nation-building. To maintain the stability 
and harmony deemed essential to China and India's development, Muslim minority groups, 
unfortunately, suffer immensely.  
Like their coercive approach to fomenting national unity, China applies similarly 
oppressive policies to fortify the central government's authority. Since announcing his first 
anticorruption rectification campaign in 2012, Xi Jinping has spearheaded bureaucratic reforms 
to address extremely unpopular and culturally entrenched endemic corruption. The creation of 
the NSC and local CDIs, implementation of spending restrictions for Party members, and 
prosecution of corrupt high-level officials all support the CCPs very public campaign to combat 
corruption in the name of national rejuvenation. These reforms, however, ironically support the 
pre-existing national culture where corruption is both accepted and rewarded. Under Xi Jinping's 
leadership, the CCPs creation of a centralized corruption infrastructure, attacks on the Party's 
rivals, and failure to eradicate traditional guanxi networks ensure that domestic corruption will 
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maintain its current prolific levels. Additionally, without substantial bureaucratic support or 
adequate, meaningful infrastructure to combat corruption, the CCPs grandiose economic goals 
supporting the China Dream will likely provide alternative avenues for corrupt practices. China's 
continually dismal rankings on Transparency International's corruption monitoring platforms 
indicate that corruption remains an undisputed fact of China's reality. Additionally, the CCPs 
corruption reforms support a broader nationalist narrative where corruption is interchangeable 
with defiance of the CCPs authority and political agenda. Effectively, the Xi Jinping era's 
anticorruption initiatives empower traditional guanxi networks to remain obedient to the CCP 
and Xi Jinping's distinct vision for China's future.  
China's restrictive domestic political environment also supports the CCPs attempts to 
fabricate a positive global image. As the future global hegemon, China must be sympathetic to 
contemporary society's concerns, specifically, environmentalism. Despite the strict confines of 
the Party's limitations for civilian activism, China's environmental CSOs are dynamic, effective, 
and savvy. Successful environmental CSOs blend Party loyalty with environmental advocacy 
while supporting noncontroversial issues that advance the environmental, and thus, the Party's, 
cause. The protests at Nu River, Xiamen, and Maoming indicate the sheer competency and 
effectiveness of China's environmental civil society. Although the CCP ultimately circumvented 
these environmental issues and advanced their economic interests through alternative avenues, 
the protests highlighted in this paper indicate the CCPs willingness take ownership of 
environmental concerns if they advance their broader nationalist agenda. The CCPs advocacy for 
creating an ecological civilization affirms the Party's fixation with manufacturing a global image 
sympathetic to China's needs. Effectively, national rejuvenation and international hegemony are 
contingent upon China's assumption of the global image of an ecological civilization. 
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The breadth of the CCPs coercive approaches to nationalism as discussed in this paper—
Muslim minority rights, domestic corruption, environmental civil society—indicate that there is 
undoubtedly a wealth of topics still requiring analysis. The Party’s quest for national unity, 
centralized authority, and the creation of a positive global image color their approaches to other 
topics. Although the treatment of Muslim minorities in India and China is a topic commonly 
discussed by the media, the treatment of other minority groups in India, China, and the global 
community requires attention. In China, specifically, the CCPs proliferation of the Han race's 
supremacy leaves countless minority groups outside the scope of political protection. Ethnic 
Tibetans, Mongols, Kazakhs, and citizens of African descent have all suffered the ramifications 
of the CCPs nationalist narrative. While the troubling circumstances of minority groups in China 
are unfortunately not uncommon throughout the global community, China's growing influence 
within the international community raises questions of its conduct toward minority rights in the 
future. In addition to assessing the status of minority groups throughout China, China's 
involvement in corruption in the global marketplace requires additional research. While Xi 
Jinping's anticorruption campaigns focused on domestic concerns, China's vast economy ensures 
it will remain a central player in the global economy. The abundant literature discussing Chinese 
corporate espionage or intellectual property disputes should expand to analyze the prevalence of 
corruption in Chinese companies operating in the international markets. Additionally, Deng 
Xiaoping’s market reforms, while frequently analyzed in the context of their implications on 
Chinese domestic corruption levels, should also be assessed through the scope of their impact on 
the development of China’s present nationalist ideology. Furthermore, given the CCPs restrictive 
approach to environmental civil society, similar practices could be evident in additional realms 
of civil society. The CCPs pervasive influence on nonconfrontational civil society topics—
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poverty, child welfare, cultural preservation—is invariably tainted by their coercive tendencies. 
Finally, the relationship between these topics—minority rights, international corruption, civil 
society—and nationalism requires analysis. The CCPs long-term global ambitions for China's 
national rejuvenation ensure that the CCPs current brand of nationalism will continue to color 
most, if not all, of their future operations.   
The CCPs modern state-centric constructivist nationalism is a formidable force in 
Chinese society. Not only does this nationalism influence China’s broader ambitions for global 
hegemony, but it also biases China’s policies regarding Muslim minority rights, domestic 
corruption, and environmental civil society. While these topics may appear independent, they 
ultimately connect to provide an essential understanding of nationalism in the Xi Jinping era. 
The CCPs efforts to enforce national unity, centralize political authority, and create a positive 
global image are small parts of China’s extensive attempts at nation-building. Singularly focused 
on supporting the China Dream of national rejuvenation, the Party applies its distinct, modern, 
and manufactured nationalism to every endeavor. The CCPs policies toward Muslim minority 
populations, domestic corruption, and environmental civil society indicate that national 
rejuvenation can only be achieved with a nationalism that is Xi Jinping designed, CCP endorsed, 
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